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AN EMERGING CONSENSUS: REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
Janet L. Dolgin*
INTRODUCTION

The advent and swift expansion of reproductive technology beginning in
the late 1970s accelerated the transformation of the family by undermining
sacred assumptions about the reproductive process. In vitro fertilization,
embryo transfer, surrogacy, and the cryopreservation of gametic and
embryonic material have challenged deeply internalized assumptions about the
character and social implications of human reproduction. In addition,
reproductive technology has placed third parties--doctors, lawyers, egg or
sperm donors, and gestational or "traditional" surrogates-directly at the
center of the reproductive process. Inevitably, disputes have developed about
the nature and parameters of parenthood and about the rights and duties of the
various new participants in the reproductive process.
Courts, faced with disputants demanding concrete solutions to these
novel arrangements, have been compelled to respond. As they have
considered these disputes, judges have almost invariably pleaded for
legislative direction.' Nevertheless, in-the United States, legislatures have
responded slowly, if at all.2
Ironically, the hesitancy of American legislatures to take on the task of
regulating reproductive technology may well prove to have been more
beneficial than detrimental. In effect, American law has had a few decades
to try various approaches, to discard those that did not work, and to elaborate

* Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor Constitutional Law, Hofstra University School
of Law; B.A., Barnard College; Ph.D. (anthropology), Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law School. I am
grateful to Professor Larry Palmer for discussing with me the issues central to this article; to Daniel May,
Assistant Director of the Hofstra Law Library for his bibliographic advice and direction; and to Karen
Rodgers and Shara Newman, students at Hofstra Law School, for assistance with research. Finally, I thank
Hofstra University for providing me with the research support that made preparation of this article
possible.
1. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Mass. 1998); In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (N.Y.
Sun. Ct. 1986).
2. In contrast, legislatures in other countries, including England, France, and Germany,
established official state policies early on. In Britain, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990
established detailed rules about the uses and consequences of reproduction technology. See Elizabeth Ann
Pitrolo, Comment, The Birds, the Bees, and the Deep Freeze: Is There InternationalConsensus in the
Debate Over Assisted Reproductive Technologies?, 19 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 147, 173-77 (1996) (giving history
of British Act). France promulgated a strict regulatory law in 1994. See id. at 190. The law, which grew
out of a report prepared by a governmental committee-the Committee on Genetic, Procreation and Law
(Procreation Genetique et Droit) (1993)-places sharp limits on the use of reproductive technology. See
id. at 190-91. German law prohibits surrogacy and limits embryo cryopreservation. See id. at 192.
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those that did. As a result of judicial trial and error, a consensus, though still
tentative and incomplete, has begun to emerge.
The shape of this consensus is indicated by three decisions, rendered by
different state courts in 1998. 3 Taken as a group, the three decisions indicate
how the law is resolving practical disputes occasioned by reproductive
technology. They implicate the developing cultural assumptions which
underlie the responses of society and law to central questions about the scope
and meaning of family in general, and about the parent-child relationship in
particular. The consensus represents a reconstruction of the ideology of
family.4 This reconstruction generally refrains from expressly abandoning
traditional understandings of the family. Instead, it invokes traditional images
of family while augmenting the variety of images through which families and
familial relationships can be understood (and thus regulated). Thus,
traditional understandings of family have been preserved. But insofar as they
compete with, and are evaluated in comparison to, entirely new
understandings, the old understandings are significantly transformed. In short,
parentage, and familial relations more generally, continue to be grounded on
a set of truths formulated during the early years of the Industrial Revolution.
But a new set of truths, significantly different from the old truths, also
determines the creation and shapes the operation of familial relationships.
The result is a more complicated and more malleable ideological conception
of family than existed even a few decades ago.5
In short, American courts have laid the groundwork for an evolving
consensus about reproductive technology. That groundwork, which reflects
a new configuration of truths on which society premises understandings of

3. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998); R.R., 689 N.E.2d at
790; Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
4. By "ideology" this article does not mean a system of political beliefs. Rather, following the
French anthropologist, Louis Dumont, it means the pervasive system of underlying beliefs which anchor
people's lives. Dumont wrote:
Our definition of ideology thus rests on a distinction that is not a distinction of
matter but one of point of view. We do not take as ideological what is left out when
everything true, rational, or scientific has been preempted. We take everything that
is socially thought,believed, acted upon, on the assumption that it is a living whole,
the interrelatedness and interdependence of whose parts would be blocked out by the
a priori introduction of our current dichotomies.
Louis DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARX: THE GENESIS AND TRIUMPH OF ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY 22
(1977).
5. The social and cultural parameters of the American family have never been stable. Certainly,
during the nineteenth century, the family changed broadly. See STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG,
DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 243 (1988) (describing American
family as continuously changing). However, contemporary changes may be different in kind insofar as they
completely challenge the ground on which family relationships were premised during the nineteenth and
most of the twentieth centuries.
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parentage, can be studied in a few dozen cases decided during the last two
decades, and summarized accurately through reliance on the three referenced
decisions rendered in 1998.6
The first case, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, decided in California,
concerns the parentage of a toddler declared parentless by a state trial court.7
That court found that none of the child's many potential parents could be
adequately characterized as a parent! The second case, RR. v. MH.,
concerns a relatively unproblematic surrogacy arrangement gone awry? In
RR., Massachusetts' highest court refused to recognize and enforce a contract
transferring parenthood from a surrogate to the intending parents.'0 Finally,
in Kass v. Kass, New York's highest court ordered the disposition of five
frozen embryos, relying on consent agreements the progenitors had entered
into with the clinic treating them for infertility."
The three cases resulted in very different resolutions, each premised on
assumptions that contrast with those undergirding the others. However, read
as a group, the decisions are harmonious and can be explained in terms of one
broad theory of familial relationships. The differences in the three holdings
do not represent different views of family or of reproductive technology.
Rather, the holdings correlate with differences in the character, and thus with
differences in the implications for families, of the specific reproductive
technologies involved.
The assumptions on which these three decisions were grounded reflect
a new pattern in social and legal responses to familial matters. 2 Broadly,
three paradigms are discernable. Each paradigm is connected to, and in at
least some regard dependent on, the other two. One view (delineated in
Buzzanca) retains a traditional rhetoric of family compelled on sentimental
grounds by the allure of traditional, enduring familial relationships. Still, this
view belies that rhetoric with a set of conclusions firmly attached to the world
of contract and autonomous individuality. A second view (delineated in KR.)

6. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280; R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 790; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 174.
7. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280.
8. See id. at 282 (describing trial court decision).
9. See R.R., 698 N.E.2d at 791.
10. See id. at 797. More accurately, the contract at issue in R.R. provided for the transfer of
custody, not parentage. See id. at 792. Presumably, the parties expected this approach to create fewer legal
hurdles than a contract providing for a transfer of parentage. The court in R.R. treated the contract as if it
provided for a transfer of parentage. See id. at 796.
11. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182.
12. The pattern is evident in earlier cases: R.R. resembles In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J.
1988) (prohibiting traditional surrogacy in New Jersey); Buzzanca stems from Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776 (Cal. 1993) (relying on intentions to establish parentage in gestational surrogacy case); and Kass
resembles Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (approving enforcement of contracts in cases
involving disputes about cryopreserved embryos).
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observes family matters in traditional terms, though clearly with the implicit
understanding that those terms and the relationships they define are no longer
inevitable. The third view (delineated in Kass) perceives family matters as
essentially indistinguishable from matters of the marketplace, and legitimizes
the application of contract law to define and regulate relationships between
family members.
Section I of this Article explains how American families were understood
during the nineteenth and first two-thirds of the twentieth centuries and
suggests how those understandings have been transformed in the last several
decades. Section II examines Buzzanca and two related California cases to
indicate the law's concern with mediating the appeal of tradition on the one
hand, and of modernity on the other. In Section III, the Article compares the
approach of the California courts in Buzzanca, a gestational surrogacy case,
with that of Massachusetts' highest court in RR, a traditional surrogacy case.
The approaches in Buzzanca and R.R, though significantly different, are then
contrasted with a third approach, defined in Section IV. Reflected in the
decision of New York's highest court in Kass, a case involving frozen
embryos, this approach relies unreservedly on contract.
Finally, this Article explores some of the socio-cultural motives that
prompted judicial choices in these cases, and suggests that the three cases,
taken as a group, present the outline (though not yet the details) of a model on
which legislatures might successfully rely.
I. IN WHAT TRUTH OR SET OF TRUTHS IS PARENTHOOD GROUNDED?

During the last several decades, the demography of the American family
has changed broadly and the ideology" of family has been dramatically
reconstructed.' 4 The "traditional" nuclear family of the 1950s has been
largely displaced, if not completely replaced, by a wide variety of family
forms. 5 Some involve married parties; some do not. In some, children live
with one adult parent or with two adult parents of the same gender. Some
involve more than two generations, step-relationships, or foster children. And
in some, children and adults live together as families, though the parties are
not "related" biologically. Indeed, a central component of the traditional
ideology of family-that family relationships stem from and reflect biogenetic

13. See supra note 4 (defining ideology).
14. See MNTz & KELLOGG, supra note 5, at 243. Contemporary changes may be different in kind,
however, insofar as they challenge completely the ground on which family relationships were premised
during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries.
15. The term "traditional" family is used to refer to the family that developed in the early years
of the Industrial Revolution, and that was most intensely and widely glorified in the middle decades of the
twentieth century. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (describing such traditional families).
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unity-has been widely supplanted by understandings of family grounded in
notions of choice.
In addition, the biological truths which once firmly anchored familial
relationships have been challenged through the startling development and
acceptance of assisted reproductive technology beginning in the late 1970s.
The use of this technology combines new social choices related to the creation
and operation of families with new understandings of the reproductive
process. As a result, familiar social and biological anchors have been
simultaneously disrupted, making it impossible to comprehend either social
change in light of biological certainties, or conversely, biological change in
light of social certainties. This new technology has compelled courts-in
startling new contexts with little precedent-to decide whether, and how
conclusively, to sanction reconstructions of the ideas of the family and
familial relationships.
A. Changes in Families and in the Ideology of Family
A modem conception of family became firmly institutionalized in the
middle decades of the nineteenth century and expanded during the succeeding
century. This conception developed simultaneously with express contrast to
the world of the marketplace. In the marketplace-the world of work and
contractual negotiation-autonomous individuals (a categorization that
excluded women and children as defined) were expected to define and redefine their relationships. Relationships within the marketplace were limited
in character and in duration by the terms of specifically defined goals. In
contrast, the family was defined as a unit of enduring loyalty and commitment.
At home, women were expected to provide sanctuary to men from the harsh
realities of the marketplace 6 and to love and nurture children who, as never
before in history, became the treasured center of family life. 7
This traditional family ideally consisted of two married parents living in
a household with their biological children. Anthropologist David M.
Schneider described such families during the middle of the twentieth

16. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY To CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY
OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 51-54 (1994) (describing developing "cult of motherhood"

during nineteenth century). A concomitant "internal preference" developed in nineteenth century custody
law. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY

AMERICA 253 (1985).
17. While middle-class children were becoming the raison d'etre of the nineteenth century family,
poor children were being systematically exploited in mills and factories. Child labor was essential, for
example, to the development of the nineteenth century textile industry. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING
THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 59 (1985). Moreover, the labor of

children was essential to the survival of many poor urban families. See id. at 58-59.
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century-just before they were widely challenged by alternative
constructions-as units of love characterized by "enduring, diffuse
solidarity"' 8 and "defined in terms of sexual intercourse as a reproductive act,
stressing the sexual relationship between husband and wife and the biological
identity between parent and child, and between siblings.'"'9
This model of family, developed in the early years of and in clear
response to the Industrial Revolution, was widely institutionalized by the start
of the twentieth century.20 Ironically, the model was most widely defended
and seemed almost irreversibly entrenched in the middle decades of the
twentieth century, just before alternative forms of family arose to challenge
those forms described as "traditional.'
Within the traditional family, roles were premised on relationships
defined in terms of status, not contract. 22 Moreover, family relationships as
compared with relationships in the marketplace, were (and in significant part
still are) understood as grounded in, and thus as reflecting, inexorable
biological truths. Family relationships, as David M. Schneider explained,
were understood to "arise out of the processes of human sexual
reproduction., 23 Thus, for example, parents were expected to love and care
for their children not because they entered into agreements to do so, but
because the "nature" of the parent-child relationship compelled, or at least
convinced, them to do so. 24 More broadly, the assumption that "blood is

18. DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 59 (David M. Schneider
ed., 1968).
19. Id. at51-52.
20. See JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN
AN UNEASY AGE 24-28 (1997).
21. See MASON, supranote 16, at 121-22 (describing vast changes in family life that accompanied
the divorce revolution).
22. In 1861 Sir Henry Maine described nineteenth century English society as "distinguished from
that of preceding generations by the largeness of the sphere which is occupied in it by contract." SIR
HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 179 (Peter Smith ed., 1970). Maine describes the world that preceded his
own as one in which relations of status "fixed a man's social position irreversibly at his birth." Id at 99.
Although Maine intended the characterization of the move from a universe based in status to one
based in contract as an historic description, the characterization more accurately represents one nineteenthcentury solution to the startling social disruption brought about by the Industrial Revolution. See DOLGIN,
supra note 20, at 70.
23.

DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, A CRITIQUE OF THE STUDY OF KINSHIP 175 (1984).

24. Although the ideology of family herein described is still important, it is no longer exclusive.
Thus, it is described throughout in the past tense.
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thicker than water" has long defined familial relationships.25 That assumption
represented and sustained the assumption that kinship, in David Schneider's
words,
is a strong solidary bond that is largely innate, a quality of human
nature, biologically determined, however much social or cultural
overlay may also be present. It is the biological character and the
innateness in human nature and not the sociocultural overlay that
largely accounts for the characteristics of the kinship bond.26
Despite the presumed inexorability of familial relationships, the specific
structure and scope of American families has never been static. As social
change has occurred, its assimilation has depended upon, or stimulated, shifts
in the popular significance of various biological truths in understanding
reproduction and kinship. 7 For instance, children, understood in earlier
centuries as belonging exclusively to fathers (whose seed was credited with
initiating the reproductive process), 28 were understood by the first half of the
nineteenth century as belonging to both their fathers and mothers, both of
whom were then viewed as having contributed "substance" to the reproductive
process.29 More important, co-existing, alternative biological truths have
explained different aspects of familial relationships. Thus, while biological
parentage has been presumed to follow from the substantial connection
between parents and their children (understood as a genetic or "blood" bond),

25. SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 165.
26. Id.at 166 (emphasis omitted). Schneider was describing the assumptions anthropologists have
brought to the study of kinship. The description applies far more generally within Western culture.
27. The concern here is with popular understandings of biological truths. These understandings
seem to harmonize with expert understandings within a broad frame. See Rayna Rapp, Heredity, or:
Revising the Facts ofLife, in NATURALIZING POWER: ESSAYS INFEMINIST CULTURAL ANALYSIS 69 (Sylvia
Yanagisako & Carol Delaney eds., 1995) [hereinafter NATURALIZING POWER]. In concluding an
anthropological consideration of amniocentesis, Rapp comments:
Normative descriptions of heredity that are developed inside of science can never be
completely aligned with popular understandings of relatedness. Scientific
descriptions naturalize a terrain on which power is continuously negotiated in social
life beyond the consulting room. Scientific discourse about biogenetic links provides
powerful resources that appear neutral .... In this essay, I have tried to illustrate how
unitary scientific norms are continuously constructed, imposed, challenged, and
sometimes resisted in popular understandings of both prenatal diagnosis and
disability.
Id. at 83-84.
28. See, e.g., Carol Delaney, Father, State, Motherland and the Birth of Modern Turkey, in
NATURALIZING POWER, supra note 27, at 183 (noting presence in both Qur an and Bible of notion of man
as generative agent, contributing "seed").
29. See Katha Politt, Checkbook Maternity: When Is a Mother Not a Mother?, THE NATION, Dec.
31, 1990, at 825.
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woman's gestational role has been invoked to underscore and explain
woman's "natural" propensity to nurture. 0 Similarly, society and law have
assumed that women "respond to the biological component more strongly and
with a different quality of relationship than men."' Thus mothers, who, like
fathers, contribute gametes to the reproductive process, can also be
distinguished from fathers.32 As a result, although gestational and genetic
maternity were assumed to be inseparable until the 1980s, mothers could at
least in theory be imagined through metaphors emphasizing either their
gestational (sustaining, nurturing) aspects, or their genetic ("blood")
contribution to parentage.33 Thus, kinship remained grounded in notions of
biological truth, despite significant transformations in actual families and in
cultural conceptions of family.
These transformations, though constant for at least the previous two
centuries, accelerated and emerged as an issue of intense public debate in the
1970s. By that time, alternative visions of family life were competing openly
with a more traditional vision.3" The most basic change involved a broad
challenge to an understanding of families as holistic, hierarchically organized
units by an alternative understanding of families that prized individual
autonomy withinfamilialcontexts.35 In addition, actual families changed. By

30. This understanding became especially significant in the nineteenth century as courts for the
first time began to grant custody of minor children to mothers rather than fathers in cases of parental
divorce and separation. See, e.g., Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 106 (N.Y. 1840) (giving
custody of child to mother because "the law of nature has given to her an attachment for her infant offspring
which no other relative will be likely to possess in an equal degree"); Prather v. Prather, 4 S.C. Eq. 33, 4344 (4 Des.) (1809) (giving custody of minor girl to mother rather than father).
31. SCHNEIDER, supra note 23, at 174.
32. By the second half of the twentieth century, a mother's gestational role was clearly
distinguished from a mother or father's genetic role as productive and reflective of a mother's social role.
In Caban v. Mohammed, Justice Stevens referred to a "symbiotic relationship" between mother and child
that provided "a physical and psychological bond ...not then present between the infant and the father or
any other person." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 405 n.10 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Four
years later, in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court's majority, in an opinion authored by
Justice Stevens, suggested that the gestational bond (but not the genetic bond) conditions biological mothers
to be social mothers. See DOLGIN, supra note 20, at 106-09 (analyzing Court's view of maternity and
paternity in several cases involving the rights of unwed fathers including Caban and Lehr).
33. By the nineteenth century, emphasis on women's "natural" propensity to nurture provided the
theoretical justification for maternal custody in divorce cases. See GROSSBERG, supra note 16, at 250-53.
However, that same emphasis limited mothers as compared with fathers. Biology gave men the opportunity
to become social fathers. Biological maternity was understood as synonymous with social maternity. See
Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Strugglefor ParentalEquality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415,
1460 (1991) (characterizing fathers as "volunteer" parents and mothers as "draftee" parents).
34. See, e.g., Kath Weston, Forever Is a Long Time: Romancing the Real in Gay Kinship
Ideologies, in NATURALIZING POWER, supranote 27, at 93 (describing gay families in the 1980s and 1990s
to include "gay and heterosexual friends as well as lovers, ex-lovers, and children who might or might not
be biogenetically connected to the gay person doing the parenting").
35. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition:From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82
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the 1970s, fifty percent of American marriages ended in divorce, and only
about one-third of families contained two parents and their minor children.3 6
Twelve percent of mothers of preschool children worked outside the home in
1950. Almost one-half did so by 1980."7
B. The Advent ofAssisted Reproductive Technology
By the last several decades of the twentieth century, American society
and law were engaged in an active, often acrimonious debate about the proper
parameters of family life. Within this cultural environment, the appearance
and rapid development of reproductive technology provided a remarkable
arena in which the law was expressly required to delineate, consider, and
perhaps cement alternative approaches to parentage and to familial
connections more generally.3" More specifically, courts were compelled for
the first time to evaluate a series of pressing challenges to accepted
understandings of the reproductive process on which familial relationships had
long been predicated. American courts were thus forced to participate in the
reconstruction of maternity, paternity, and the parent-child relationship.
The appearance of new reproductive technology in the last two decades
of the twentieth century compelled society to reconsider the biological truths
on which familial relationships were predicated, and the implications of those
truths. In cases occasioned by "traditional" surrogacy-gestational surrogacy,
cryopreserved embryos and gametes--courts began to focus on and then to
question the strength and continuing significance of long-standing
assumptions about the implications of biological reproduction for familial
relationships.39

GEO. L.J. 1519 (1994) (analyzing differences between Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and
Eisenstadt v. Baird,405 U.S. 438 (1972)). These sources reflect the increasing readiness of society and
law to predicate family relations on autonomy of individual actors within family settings rather than on
holism of familial units.
36. See Elaine Tyler May, Myths and Realities of the American Family, in 5 A HISTORY OF
PRIVATE LIFE 539, 583 (Antoine Prost & Gerard Vincent eds., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1991).
37. See id. at 587.
38. Within the last two decades, cases occasioned by reproductive technology primarily have
involved disputes about the consequences of surrogacy arrangements and disputes about cryopreserved
(frozen) gametes and embryos. Of those cases involving disputes about surrogacy arrangements, some have
involved the artificial insemination of surrogate mothers. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'dinpart,andrev dinpart,537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). This case could be
termed a "traditional" surrogacy case-with the goal of creating a baby to be raised by the genetic father
and his wife. Other so-called traditional surrogacy cases have involved surrogates entering into agreements
with single people, unmarried heterosexuals, or same-sex cohabitants as the intending parents. Still other
surrogacy cases, termed "gestational" rather than "traditional" have involved surrogates gestating embryos
created from donated ova. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
39. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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Courts have spearheaded and sustained the law's response to
reproductive technology in the United States. Legislatures have been slow to
respond, and when they have responded, they have rarely created
comprehensive regulatory schemes. 0 As a result, case law constructed in the
context of particular disputes has directed the legal response to reproductive
technology in the United States. Despite the repeated call of courts and
commentators for a fuller statutory response to the dilemmas created by
reproductive technology, the comparative weakness of the legislative response
has resulted in a more flexible judicial response.4 In contrast, in Britain or
France, quick, comprehensive national legislation effectively curtailed judicial
experimentation relatively early.42
Faced with disputes between mothers and fathers, mothers and other
mothers, and parents or potential parents and third parties (including fertility
clinics) some courts invoked, and thus reaffirmed, traditional understandings
of family. Thus, in In re Baby M,the trial court and the New Jersey Supreme
Court reached different holdings, yet based them in the same traditional
ideological assumptions about family.43 The decision of the Massachusetts
court in RR v. MH categorized traditional surrogacy as a form of adoption,
and consequently refused to enforce traditional surrogacy agreements. In that
regard the decision resembles Baby M' which remains the best known
surrogacy case harmonizing with traditional understandings of family.
Other courts have moved tentatively, however, onto new terrain in
recognizing the "intent" to parent as one ground on which to predicate

40. Less than two-fifths of the states have statutes that regulate surrogacy. See HARRY D. KRAUSE
ET. AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 390 (4th ed. 1998). Only a few states have
statutes regulating more complicated reproductive options such as egg donation. See D. KELLY WEISBERG
& SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1258-59 (1998).
In addition, a few relevant federal statutes exist. Section 263a-2 of the Assisted Reproductive
Technology Programs Act requires infertility clinics to report success rates accurately. See 42 U.S.C. §
263a-2 (1994). The Act also set up a model certification program, but participation was not made
mandatory. See id. § 263a-2(I); see also Meena Lal, The Role of the FederalGovernment in Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 517, 533-36 (1997)
(delineating federal responses in the United States).
41. See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34
HOUS. L. REV. 609, 646-51 (1997) (describing state statutory responses); Lal, supra note 40, at 533-42
(summarizing extant and proposed federal regulatory schemes).
42. See generallyPitrolo, supra note 2, at 173-77, 181-91.
43. See generally Baby M, 525 A.2d. 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). See also Janet L.
Dolgin, Status and Contractin Surrogate Motherhood: An Illumination of the SurrogacyDebate, 38 BUFF.
L. REV. 515 (1990) (analyzing cultural assumptions underlying opinions of both courts that entertained the
case). The trial court granted parentage to the genetic, intending father and terminated the parental rights
of the surrogate who was both the genetic and the gestational mother. See Baby M, 525 A.2d at 1176. The
state supreme court allowed custody to rest with the father, but restored the surrogate's legal maternity. See
BabyM, 537 A.2d at 1244.
44. See generally Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128.
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"natural" parentage. In Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court
granted parentage to the intending, genetic parents in a dispute with a
gestational surrogate. 45 The court stated that in cases in which genetic and
gestational maternity "do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to
procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a
child that she intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under
California law.",46 And still other courts, resolving disputes occasioned by
reproductive technology, have expressly enforced contractual agreements into
which the disputing parties entered. In Kass v. Kass, the New York Court of
Appeals resolved a dispute between a divorcing husband and wife about the
fate of five cryopreserved embryos created from their gametes 7 The court
relied on dispositional agreements signed by the couple before the
cryopreservation of their pre-zygotes. 5
The law today expressly recognizes not one or two central truths on the
basis of which it grounds parentage, but rather a diverse set of truths. A set
of contrasting assumptions that ground parentage in conscious, deliberate
decisions and agreements, i.e., in intentions and in contracts, have appeared
alongside traditional assumptions about parentage that ground the parent-child
relationship firmly on biological truths. These new assumptions, for example,
that intention can weigh as heavily as biology in determining "natural"
maternity, contrast almost completely with understandings of parentage,
especially of maternity, that were forged early in the Industrial Revolution and
were subsequently safeguarded and relied upon for most of the next two
centuries.

II. A NEW MODEL

OF PARENTAGE: JOHNSON, MOSCHEFrA, AND BUZZANCA

The far reaching implications of the law's increasing readiness to
premise parentage on a wide set of assumptions about human relationships,
rather than more exclusively on assumptions about the nature of the
reproductive process, become clear in a set of cases all decided in California
in the 1990s. In the first case, Johnson v. Calvert, decided in 1993,
California's supreme court premised parenthood on intention.4 9 That result

45. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
46. Id. (footnote omitted).
47. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998); see also infra Part IV for further
consideration of Kass.
48. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176-77. Relying on the progenitors' signed consent forms, the court
ordered that the cryopreserved pre-zygotes be "donated to the IVF program for approved research
purposes." Id. at 182. The term "pre-zygote" is used to refer to the fused egg and sperm following
fertilization. See id. at 175 n.I.
49. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), cert. dismissed sub. nom. Baby Boy J. v.
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followed from the court's recognition that neither statutory law nor
assumptions about biological maternity identified the "natural" mother of a
child created as the result of a gestational surrogacy agreement." In the
second case, In re Marriage of Moschetta, decided in 1994, the California
Court of Appeals refused to apply the Johnson intent-model to a case
involving not a gestational, but a traditional surrogacy agreement." Thus,
Moschetta suggested the limits of Johnson in asserting that some sort of
biological maternal connection between mother and child is essential to the
identification of "natural" maternity. Finally, in 1998, In re Marriage of
Buzzanca tested the limits of Johnson once again, and expanded Johnson's
reach beyond that suggested by Moschetta.52 In Buzzanca, the California
Court of Appeal was compelled to select between the model of maternity
constructed in Johnson and that constructed in Moschetta in order to
determine the parentage of a child with five (or arguably eight) potential
parents. 3 Buzzanca is an important decision, not so much for the specific
holding, but because the appellate court extended the holding in Johnson that
"natural" maternity can be predicated on intention to a woman who bore no
biological connection to the child involved.54 Buzzanca reaffirmed the
applicability of non-biological criteria to the identification of maternity. But
in doing that, the decision sacrificed consistency. Thus, Buzzanca is as
important for the questions it raised but left unanswered, as for the questions
it entertained and settled.
A. Intentional Parentage:Johnson v. Calvert"
1. The Decision
Johnson arose in 1990 as a dispute about a child's parentage between
genetic, intending parents, Crispina and Mark Calvert, and a gestational
mother, Anna Johnson.56 The Calverts, a married couple, were unable to have

Johnson, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
50. See id. at 779-81.
51. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994).
52. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
53. See id. at 288-89. At least five people could have cognizable claims to the child whose
parentage was at issue: the egg donor, the sperm donor, the gestational surrogate, the intending father, and
the intending mother. This number rises to eight if the spouses of the egg donor, the sperm donor, and the
gestational surrogate are included. See id.
at 282.
54. See id. at 288, 294.
55. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X-633190 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990), aff'd sub. nom.
Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991), aff'd sub. nom. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776
(Cal. 1993), cert. dismissed sub. nom. Baby Boy J. v. Johnson, 510 U.S. 938 (1993).
56. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. Use of words such as "mother" and "parent" in describing a
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a baby without medical assistance because Crispina's uterus had been
surgically removed in 1984."7 Her ovaries remained and continued to produce
ova. In 1989, Anna, a co-worker of Crispina, learned of the Calverts' search
for a gestational surrogate and offered to serve in that role. 8
The parties entered into a surrogacy agreement in January 1990 that
provided Anna would gestate an embryo created from Crispina and Mark's
gametes and would give birth to the resulting baby. 9 Anna further agreed
that, at the baby's birth, she would surrender maternal rights to the Calverts.6 °
The agreement further provided that the Calverts would pay Anna $10,000 in
a series of installments." Anna became pregnant that month.62 Six months
later, still pregnant, she informed the Calverts in writing that unless they paid
the entire balance due she would refuse to surrender parental rights upon the
child's birth.63 As a result, several months before the birth of baby
Christopher in September 1990, his genetic parents and gestational mother
were in court disputing his "natural" and legal parentage.'
Throughout history, judges have distinguished between "real" mothers
and other women. King Solomon decided the most famous custody case
almost three thousand years ago.65 But prior to Johnson, a court had never
been asked to select the "natural" mother of a child in a case in which the
biological facts were certain. And never before had a court been asked to
decide the parentage of a child with two biological mothers. There was no
doubt that both Anna Johnson and Crispina Calvert were linked biologically
to baby Christopher.
Several options were available to the California courts. Arguably, the
genetic mother was the real (and thus legal) mother. Or, perhaps the
gestational mother was. State statutes gave some, though only limited support

case such as Johnson may prejudge relevant issues. However, one of the most confusing aspects of
discussions about parentage in cases occasioned by reproductive technology is terminological. Inevitably,
the terms used to describe parties such as Crispina Calvert, Mark Calvert, and Anna Johnson reflect their
relationships and roles. This Article uses the terms "parent" and "mother," rather than other, more neutral
terms, to emphasize the weight of each party's claim to parentage.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. King Solomon resolved a dispute between two women, each of whom claimed to be the mother
of a baby. The other mother's baby had died. Although Solomon depended on a social/psychological test
to identify the baby's mother, there was no question but that the baby had only one biological mother. See
I Kings 3:23-28.
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to each of these possibilities.6 6 In the view of some, these were the only
sensible possibilities. The appellate court, for instance, framed the case to
require identification of the baby's one "natural," and thus "legal," mother.67
In order to do that, the court concluded it was necessary to choose "[t]he
woman who nurtures the child in her womb and gives birth or the otherwise
infertile woman whose egg is implanted into the woman who gives birth. 68
The choices were broader still. The courts could have decided that both
women, each having demonstrated a biological connection to the baby, were
"natural" (real) mothers and that as a consequence, the baby had two legal
mothers. 69 Alternatively, the courts could have concluded that the baby had
no "natural" mother because no woman performed all the essential tasks of
"natural" maternity. 'Finally, the courts could have relied-as the state
supreme court did rely-on non-biological indices in order to identify the
baby's natural, and thus legal, mother (or mothers).
All three state courts that heard the case established parentage in the
Calverts. 0 Unsurprisingly, in a case raising so many startlingly novel
questions, each court grounded its holding in a different set of conclusions
about the facts of the case and about the law. The trial court premised the
Calvert's parentage on genetics by concluding that Crispina Calvert was the
child's "genetic, biological and natural mother" while Anna Johnson was but
a "gestational carrier," a "host," and a "genetic hereditary stranger[]" to the
child.7' Judge Parslow for the trial court, comparing Anna Johnson to a foster
parent and a wet nurse, defined her role as social rather than biological.72 The
court agreed that Anna's help in the creation of the child was essential. She
provided "nurturing, feeding, [and] protect[ion] of the child during the period
' But that assistance could
of time that Crispina Calvert was unable to do so."73
not be taken to constitute Anna's maternity.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed, though its decision was
premised on a reading of state statutory law, rather than on the trial court's

66. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 780. The intermediate appellate court relied on statutory law to find
that Crispina Calvert's genetic connection to the child constituted her natural maternity. See infra note 74
and accompanying text.
67. See Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 371. The court explained the importance of identifying the
baby's "natural" mother: "[That] is important because, except in cases of adoption, the 'legal' mother of
a child is the 'natural' mother." Id.
68. Id.
69. In an amicus brief presented to the state supreme court, the American Civil Liberties Union
argued that the court should find the child to have two legal mothers. The court rejected that suggestion.
See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 n.8.
70. See, e.g., Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
71. Johnson, No. X-633190, slip op. at *5.
72. See id., slip op. at *5-6, *17.
73. Id., slip op. at *7.
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less mediated conclusion that parentage is, and should be, grounded in genetic
connection. Relying on the Uniform Parentage Act, promulgated in California
in the mid-1970s, the appellate court declared Crispina Calvert to be the
baby's natural, and thus legal, mother.74
Finally, the state supreme court affirmed, but on entirely different
grounds. Concluding that neither the parties' biological relationships to the
child nor state statutory rules provided clear direction, the court relied on the
intentions of the parties to parent in determining that the Calverts were the
child's natural and legal parents.75 The court explained that "[b]ecause two
women each have presented acceptable proof of maternity, we do not believe
this case can be decided without enquiring into the parties' intentions as
' Moreover, the court
manifested in the surrogacy agreement."76
concluded:
[A]lthough the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and
giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child
relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman,
she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended
to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her
own-is the natural mother under California law.77
2. Remaining Questions
The replacement of biogenetic links with links of choice and intention as
the ground of parentage raises a series of important questions. The court
answered some in Johnson. Others remain unaddressed."

74. Under section 7004 of the California Civil Code a man was "presumed to be the natural father
of a child if he meets the conditions as set forth in section 621 of the Evidence Code." Anna J., 286 Cal.
Rptr. at 374 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004 (West 1983)). Section 621 of the Evidence Code provided in
turn that
if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence
based upon blood tests performed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section
890), of Division 7, are that the husband is not the father of the child, the question
ofpaternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly.
Id. at 375 (alteration in original). Moreover, section 7015 of the California Civil Code provided that
provision of the act applicable to definitions of the father-child relationship could be applied to demonstrate
the existence of a mother-child relationship as well. See id. at 374 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015 (West
1983)).
In addition, section 7003 (1) of the Parentage Act provided that a parent-child relationship may be
established "[b]etween a child and the natural mother.., by proof of her having given birth to the child."
Id.at 377.
75. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Among the questions raised by Johnson are the following: Is there a difference between
parentage that stems from biology and parentage that stems from choice ("intention")? In what sorts of
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The Johnson court relied on the surrogacy contract into which the parties
had entered to discern intentions, and in doing that declared that the agreement
was not "on its face, inconsistent with public policy."'79 Beyond that however,
the court did not delineate the potential legal consequences of contractual
arrangements in surrogacy cases and in other cases involving reproductive
technology. 0 Yet, the court was more certain and explicit about its resolution
of other questions raised by its reliance on intentional parentage.8 '
First, the court explicitly precluded the likely misunderstanding that its
holding determined custody, but not parentage.82 Indeed, the court criticized
the dissent's suggestion that maternity be established by ascertaining the "best
interests" of the child because that approach would "confuse[] concepts of
parentage and custody." 83
"Logically," the court continued, "the
determination of parentage must precede, and should not be dictated by,
eventual custody decisions." Second, the court defined Crispina's maternity
as "natural," thereby precluding the need for her to adopt baby Christopher.
Finally, the court asserted clearly that its preference for the genetic parents
in Johnson depended on their parental intentions and did not imply a judicial
preference for genetic over gestational maternity.8 6 In a situation of ova
donation in which a woman gestates and gives birth to a baby with the
intention of raising the child, the court proclaimed, "the birth mother is the
natural mother under California law."87

situations will the law look to parental intention in determining parentage? Will parental intentions govern
in more complicated and startling cases spawned by reproductive technologies than those considered to
date? Must some biological connection exist before the law will determine parentage based on intention?
When, that is to say, can parentage be premised on intention, and when, in the absence of biological links,
must parentage be premised on adoption thus necessitating compliance with a comprehensive scheme of
statutory rules? How will the law determine parental intentions? What evidence is adequate? How will the
law handle contradictory or transitory intentions? Is intentional parentage distinguishable from "natural"
parentage? And, does the recognition of intentional parentage prefigure the recognition and enforcement
of contracts to determine parentage, at least in cases occasioned by certain types of reproductive
technology?
79. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783.
80. See Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed. Defining Motherhood in the Era of
Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 510-14 (1996) (comparing contract-approach
with intent-approach to determining parentage); Janet L. Dolgin, The "Intent" of Reproduction:
Reproductive Technologies and the Parent-ChildBond, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 1261 (1994) (identifying limits
and inconsistencies of the intent-approach to determination of parentage).
81. See Coleman, supra note 80, at 510-14.
82. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 n.10.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. (footnote omitted).
86. See id. at 783.
87. Seeid. at 782 n.10.
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Thus, some of the implications of the judicial reliance on intention in
cases such as Johnson are made clear. Others are not. Among the pressing
practical questions left open in Johnson is the extent to which the intentapproach would be deemed applicable in other sorts of cases. This question,
and several others left unanswered in Johnson are addressed either expressly
or implicitly in Moschetta and Buzzanca,"9 when read together with Johnson.
B. Limits on IntentionalParentage:In re Marriageof Moschetta
After Johnson, it was almost inevitable that a state court would be asked
to apply Johnson's intent-analysis to a case occasioned by a traditional
surrogacy arrangement. In Johnson, the supreme court explained its reliance
on intention as a tie breaker: "Because two women each have presented
acceptable proof of maternity, we do not believe this case can be decided
without enquiring into the parties' intentions as manifested in the surrogacy
agreement. ' It was not clear, however, whether intentions, having been
identified as a ground of "natural" parentage, could establish parentage in the
absence of a biological connection. Perhaps the Johnson court assumed that
Crispina Calvert's and Anna Johnson's biological connection to the child were
sufficiently alike to establish either woman's maternity, and therefore parental
intentions were invoked only to select between two "natural" mothers.9 In
contrast, the court read more into intentional parentage, and would, in a future
case, be willing to premise maternity on intention in the absence of a
biological link between child and intending mother. This approach is
suggested by the assertions that intending parents "are the first cause, or the
prime movers, of the procreative relationship' 2 and that "intentions that are
voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively
to determine legal parenthood."93
A year after Johnson, the California courts considered the limits of
intentional parentage in a case involving a traditional surrogacy agreement.
Moschetta involved a dispute between an intending genetic father, Robert
Moschetta, and a traditional surrogate, Elvira Jordan.94 As a social though not
88. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893.
89. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280.
90. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
91. This is the view most clearly suggested by the text of Johnson. However, the opinion of the
California appellate court in Buzzanca, see infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text, relies on an
alternative reading of Johnson.
92. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (quoting John L. Hill, What Does it Mean to Be a "Parent"?:The
Claims of Biology as the Basisfor ParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 415 (1991)).
93. Id at 783 (quoting Marjorie Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:
An Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 WiS. L. REV. 297, 323).
94. See generally Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893.
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a biological matter, the case differed from the best known modem surrogacy
case, In re Baby M 95 In Baby M, the intending parents, William and Elizabeth
Stern, argued for parentage together, opposing the genetic and gestational
surrogate mother, Mary Beth Whitehead.96 In contrast, in Moschetta, the
surrogacy case arose as the marriage between Cynthia and Robert Moschetta
disintegrated.9 7
Cynthia, sixteen years Robert's senior and already a mother when she
married Robert at age 40, had had a tubal ligation.9" The parties knew that
Cynthia was unlikely to have more biological children, but several years after
their marriage they decided they wanted children.9 9 They attempted fertility
treatment, but without success."° Then, in 1989, the Moschettas turned to
surrogacy.'' A surrogacy broker introduced the Moschettas to Elvira
Jordan. 0 2 The parties negotiated a surrogacy contract without the aid of
counsel.013 Jordan agreed to be artificially inseminated with Robert's sperm,
to gestate and give birth to the resulting baby, to then terminate her parental
rights, and finally to assist" in the adoption process that would make Cynthia
the baby's legal mother.0 5 The Moschettas agreed to pay Jordan $10,000.'°
The artificial insemination was performed privately, without medical
assistance. 107
Before the birth of baby Marissa in May 1990, the Moschettas marriage
began to deteriorate, and they considered divorce.0 8 Elvira, learning of the
couple's marital problems while she was in labor, reconsidered the surrogacy
agreement." Soon after Marissa's birth in May 1990, Cynthia went to court
seeking a dissolution of her marriage to Robert and parental rights to and
custody of Marissa." As part of the Moschetta's divorce action, the trial

95. See In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'dinpart,
537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
96. See id.
97. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
98. Moschetta v. Moschetta, No. D. 324349, slip op. at 3 (Super. Ct. Orange County Mar. 9,
1993).
99. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
100. See Moschella, No. D. 324349, slip op. at 3.
101. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
102. See id.
103. See Moschetta, No. D. 324349, slip op. at 3.
104. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
105. See id.
106. See id. The payment was described as being "in 'recognition' of Robert's 'obligation to
support [the] child and his right to provide [Jordan] with living expenses."' Id.
107. See Moschetta, No. D. 324349, slip op. at 3.
108. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
109. See id.
110. See id.
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court determined that Robert Moschetta and Elvira Jordan were the parents of
the baby born pursuant to the surrogacy contract and granted them joint legal
and physical custody."' Later, Cynthia dropped the request that she be named
Marissa's mother." 2 She filed a brief with the appellate court supporting the
trial court's declaration of Elvira's maternity."' Robert continued to argue for
Cynthia's legal motherhood in order to preclude Elvira's maternity and his
having to share custody of Marissa with Elvira." 4
Johnson was decided between the time the trial court in Moschetta
rendered a decision and Robert's appeal of that decision. Robert thus argued
on appeal that, on either of two grounds, Johnson necessitated overturning the
trial court's holding:
Certainly, the decision in Johnson v. Calvert has affected Robert's
presentation of some of his legal arguments on appeal. Most
notably, Robert argues that because the Uniform Parentage Act
...
provides contradictory conclusions concerning maternity, this
case should be decided with reference to the parties' intentions as
manifested by the surrogacy contract .... Alternatively, Robert
urges enforcement of the contract, noting that Johnson v. Calvert
held that surrogacy contracts are not inconsistent with public
policy." 5
More specifically; Robert premised Cynthia's maternity on two provisions of
California law. First, he argued that California Evidence Code, section 621
presumed the husband of a child's mother-assuming that the husband was
neither impotent or sterile-to be that child's father. 16 Robert argued the
provision was applicable through California Civil Code Section 7015, which
provided for application of provisions relevant to the establishment of
paternity to the determination of maternity." 7
The appellate court rejected Robert's argument declaring that the
presumption can be rebutted by genetic testing." 8 Indeed, blood testing

Ill. Seeid.
112. See id. at 895-96 (supporting judgment precluding her maternity).
113. See id. at 896.
114. See id. at 897.
115. Reply Brief of Appellant Robert Moschetta at 2, Moschetta (Nos. G013880, G014430).
116. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896.
117. See Reply Brief of Appellant Robert Moschetta at 12, Moschetta (Nos. G013880, G014430).
In Johnson, the supreme court noted that a provision of Evidence Code Section 621 that allowed the
determination of paternity through blood testing could be applied to argue in favor of Crispina Calvert's
maternity. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 780-8 1.
118. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896.
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ordered by the trial court had established Elvira's genetic maternity." 9
Further, the court noted the statute's inapplicability on the clear facts of the
case; Cynthia was, in fact, sterile. 2
Second, Robert argued that Cynthia "received" the child into her home
and should therefore, on equal protection grounds, be deemed the mother.' 2,
He relied on the California presumption that a man is presumed to be the
natural father of a child if he "receives the child into his home and openly
holds out the child as his natural child.' 2 2 The appellate court disagreed,
declaring that Cynthia had, in fact, "never held Marissa out as her 'natural'
child. There never was any doubt that Marissa has no biological, natural or
genetic connection with Cynthia.'12 In short, the court re-affirmed Elvira's
maternity by concluding that presumptions about natural maternity are
inappropriate to a case such as Moschetta
in which there is "no question about
24
biological parenthood to settle."'
Finally, the court directly considered Robert's reliance on the surrogacy
contract into which the parties had entered. 125 Here, the court clearly outlined
its understanding of the legal ground on which parentage in California could
be determined.'26 In the absence of natural maternity, the court proclaimed,
a woman could establish a mother-child relationship only by complying with
procedures outlined in the state's adoption law. 127 1The
agreement at issue in
2
compliance.
such
for
substitute
not
did
Moschetta
In sum, the Moschetta court premised maternity on either nature or
adoption. It limited "natural" maternity to women with some biological
connection to the child involved. 29 Before Johnson, this conclusion would
have been entirely unremarkable. After Johnson, however, with its reliance
on intentionality to determine parentage, the limits of that reliance had to be
established. By distinguishing between intentional-biological mothers and

119. See id. at 897.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. Id. (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 761 l(d) (1994)). See also Reply Brief of Appellant Robert
Moschetta at 18, Moschetta (Nos. G013880, G01443).
123. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897. The court's delineation of three grounds on which to
predicate matemity--"biological, natural or genetic"-is suggestive. Although the appellate court in
Moschetta refused to rely on the parties' intentions to establish parentage, the court's differentiation of
"natural" from genetic and biological (presumably, gestational) maternity, suggests that in some cases
"natural" parentage might be found apart from any biological or genetic relationship between a putative
parent and a child. Buzzanca, see infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text, is such a case.
124. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897 (emphasis omitted).
125. Seeid. at900.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
at 897.
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other biological mothers and by designating members of only the first group
as "natural" mothers, Johnson raised the possibility that naturalmaternity
might exist even in the absence of a biological connection. While Moschetta
seemed to settle this issue in the context of a traditional surrogacy
arrangement, 30 Buzzanca 13' reopened the issue in the context of another, still
more complicated set of reproductive facts.
C. Re-examining the Limits of IntentionalParentage:In Re Marriageof
Buzzanca
Buzzanca resembles Moschetta. However, one major fact-found
determinative by the California Court of Appeal-and several less essential
facts differentiate the two cases. As in Moschetta, Buzzanca involved a
surrogacy arrangement between intending parents, a married couple, Luanne
and John Buzzanca, and a surrogate, Pamela Snell.' As in Moschetta, the
marriage of the intending parents dissolved before the birth of the child
produced as a result of the surrogacy agreement.'
Buzzanca differed from
Moschetta in that neither intending parent in Buzzanca was a genetic parent
to the baby involved, a girl named Jaycee, born in 1995.'
Rather, the
Buzzancas had arranged for Snell to become pregnant through use of an
embryo created from the sperm and ovum of anonymous donors at an
infertility clinic in California.'35
130. The appellate court decision in Moschetta did not settle law for the entire state. California's
highest court denied review. See Moschetta v. Moschetta, No. S041098, 1994 Cal. LEXIS 5623 (Oct. 13,
1994).
It is possible that a future court, especially with Buzzanca as precedent, see infra note 150 and
accompanying text, might determine maternity through reliance on intentions in a traditional surrogacy
case. The facts of Moschetta were especially inhospitable to such an interpretation, since the intending
mother was uninterested in being the child's legal mother or custodial parent.
131. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280; notes 132-77 infra and accompanying text.
132. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282. The Buzzancas had attempted to become parents
through fertility treatments before turning to surrogacy. See Donna Foote, Family: And Baby Makes One:
In a Bizarre Clashof the Law and Fertility Techniques,Jaycee is a Child Without a Parent,NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 2, 1998, at 68. John was diagnosed with a low sperm count, and Luanne suffered from endometriosis.
The couple were unsuccessful with both artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization. See id
133. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 282.
134. See id.
135. See 48 Hours: The Family Tree; ChildBorn to In-vitro FertilizationMay Have Been Created
From Stolen Embryo (CBS television broadcast, May 14, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library
[hereinafter 48 Hours]. Although-the Buzzancas and Snell all apparently believed that Jaycee's genetic
parents were unidentifiable, they may well have been identified in May 1998. See id.Jaycee was
conceived at a fertility clinic connected with the University of Califomia-Irvine. See id.The clinic, headed
by Drs. Ricardo Asch and Jose Balmaceda, was closed in 1995 after the revelation of a scandal involving
the donation of embryos to clinic patients from other patients who had not consented to such donation. See
id In 1998, a lawyer, tracing the clinic's stolen embryos, identified Jaycee's genetic parents and informed
them of Jaycee's existence. See id. The sperm donor and his wife (who wish to remain anonymous)
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Several less crucial facts also distinguish Buzzanca from Moschetta. In
Buzzanca, unlike most surrogacy cases leading to disputes that have been
resolved in court, the surrogate did not seek parental rights.'36 Several months
after the baby's birth, Luanne, who had brought the child home from the
hospital, sought child support from John as part of the action to dissolve their
marriage.' 37 John admitted he had signed the surrogacy contract, but denied
paternity of the resulting child. 3 ' Among other things, he argued that because
he signed the surrogacy agreement after the baby's conception, he was not a
party to the contract.'39 Luanne, free to initiate adoption proceedings, chose
of her own-and therefore presumably, of
instead to press for a declaration
140
parentage.
John's-natural
The case thus differed from virtually all previously litigated disputes
occasioned by reproductive technology in that only one (Luanne) of the baby's
six to eight potential parents requested parentage. Another (John) actively
denied and rejected parentage, and as part of that effort, argued against the
parentage of the one willing parent.14'
.In March 1997, almost two years after the baby's birth, the trial court
concluded that neither Luanne nor John was a lawful parent of baby Jaycee.' 42
The court further accepted a stipulation that Pamela Snell, the gestational
surrogate, was not the child's lawful mother. 43 In a holding reminiscent of

became the parents of twins through use of eggs donated to the clinic. See id. In the aftermath of their
successful fertility treatments, they apparently consented to use of the remaining thirteen embryos created
from the husband's sperm and the donor's eggs. See id. One of those embryos apparently implanted in
Pamela Snell, led to the birth of Jaycee. See id. If the allegations are correct, Jaycee is the full genetic
sibling of the twins born to the sperm donor and his wife.
Both the apparent sperm and egg donors are married, as is Pamela Snell. As a result, eight adults
might present a cognizable parental interest in the case: Luanne Buzzanca, John Buzzanca, gestational
surrogate Pamela Snell and her husband, the sperm donor and his wife and the egg donor and her husband.
136. Snell did file for custody during the course of the dispute between the Buzzancas apparently
because she was concerned about handing the child over to a divorcing couple. Later, however, she
withdrew her claim. See Davan Maharaj, Case May Redefine Fatherhoodin State, L.A. TIMES, September
14, 1997, at B1.
137. See Jaycee B. v. Superior Court of Orange County, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694 (Ct. App. 1996)
(declaring trial court had jurisdiction to force John Buzzanca to pay temporary child support pending
decision on question of his parenthood).
138. Seeid.at696.
139. John argued that the child was not born pursuant to a surrogacy agreement since he signed the
alleged agreement on August 25, 1994, two weeks after the embryo was implanted in the surrogate. The
court concluded that an agreement in fact existed before August 25. Before that date, the contract was oral.
See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 283.
140. See id. at 282.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 283.
143. See id. at 282.
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traditional laws defining and regulating bastardy, the court declared Jaycee a
child without parentage. Trial court Judge Robert Monarch declared:
So I think what evidence there is, is stipulated to. And I don't think
there would be any more. One, there's no genetic tie between
Luanne and the child. Two, she is not the gestational mother.
Three, she has not adopted the child. That, folks, to me,
respectfully, is clear and convincing evidence that she's not the
legal mother.'44
John was thus relieved of the $386 a month he was paying in child support,'45
and Luanne's potential maternity was made dependent on her willingness and
ability to comply with state adoption procedures."4 It was not, however,
perfectly clear from whom Luanne was to adopt the child since, in the law's
view, the child was without a natural parent.'4 7
On appeal, the court described the trial court's conclusion as
"extraordinary,"'' and reversed:
Jaycee had no lawful parents. First, the woman who gave birth to
Jaycee was not the mother .... Second, Luanne was not the

mother. According to the trial court, she could not be the mother
because she had neither contributed the egg nor given birth. And
John could not be the father, because, not having contributed the
sperm, he had no biological relationship with the child.
We disagree. Let us get right to the point: Jaycee never
would have been born had not Luanne and John both agreed to have
a fertilized egg implanted in a surrogate. 4 9
The court rejected what it described as the trial court's "adoption default"
model and concluded that the Buzzancas' parentage was established at the
baby's birth by reason of their parental intentions. 5 0
Reversing the trial court's decision that no one offered a cognizable
claim to Jaycee's parentage, the appellate court offered a n6vel view of the
ties that bind parent and child. That view enabled the court to conclude that

144. Id.at 283.
145. See Maharaj, supra note 136, at B1.
146. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
147. See Ann Davis, High-Tech Births Spawn Legal Riddles, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1998, at BI1
(quoting Jeffrey Doeringer, court-appointed lawyer for Jaycee, asking from whom Luanne was to adopt the
child in light of trial court opinion).
148. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282.
149. Id (emphasis omitted).
150. See id. at 288-89.
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establishing natural parentage under the law need not depend on proof of any
biological relation between mother and child.151 Thus, the court was able to
reject the "adoption default model" of parentage in cases occasioned by
reproductive technology.' 52 The court declared:
The "adoption default" model is... inconsistent with both statutory
law and the Supreme Court's Johnson decision. As to the statutory
law, the Legislature has already made it perfectly clear that public
policy (and, we might add, common sense) favors, whenever
possible, the establishment of legal parenthood with the
concomitant responsibility.'53
In place of a model that would require Luanne to adopt baby Jaycee, the
appellate court grounded her maternity first on the state's statutory scheme for
regulating parentage in cases of artificial insemination, and second, on an
expansive reading of the state supreme court's decision in Johnson.'54 In fact,
both conclusions-that Luanne's maternity could be grounded on artificial
insemination statutes, and that it followed clearly from Johnson-are
premised on the expansion of the explicit assumptions undergirding state
artificial insemination laws and Johnson's holding.
The Buzzanca court concluded that Luanne, having consented to the
conception and birth of baby Jaycee, presented a cognizable claim to be that
baby's mother.'55 "The same rule," the court asserted, "which makes a
husband the lawful father of a child born because of his consent to artificial
insemination should be applied here . . . to both husband and wife.' 5 6
Moreover, declared the court, the circumstances of Jaycee's birth resembled
those of a birth resulting from artificial insemination because "[i]n each
instance, a child is procreated because a medical procedure was initiated and
consented to by intended parents. '

151. See id at 290 (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 289 (citation omitted).
153. Id.
154. See id. at 288-90.
155. See id. at 288.
156. Id. at 282.
157. Id. Lawmakers have stressed the involvement, or lack of involvement, of medical
professionals in delineating parental rights in reproductive technology cases. For instance, the Uniform
Parentage Act provides that the consenting husband of a woman who becomes pregnant through
heterologous artificial insemination under the supervision of a doctor is treated "as if he were the natural
father of a child thereby conceived." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a), 9b U.L.A. 301 (1987). Furthermore,
a donor who provides semen "to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman
other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived." Id. § 5(b), 9b U.L.A. 301 (1987). Thus, with regard to the sperm donor and to the mother's
husband, the legal consequences depend on the parties having had medical supervision.
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Artificial insemination statutes may well provide a reasonable model for
the regulation of gestational (or traditional) surrogacy' 58 That conclusion,
however, depends on a set of assumptions about familial, especially parentchild, relationships that go beyond the express assumptions undergirding
artificial insemination statutes. These statutes, widely promulgated beginning
in the 1960s, explain a mother's husband's paternity by reference to the man's
position as "mother's husband"--as spouse to the biological mother.'59
Certainly, Luanne's maternity cannot be predicated on her spousal
relationship to baby Jaycee's biological father since the biological father was
an anonymous sperm donor. John, like Luanne, had no biological link to the
child. Thus in Buzzanca, parental consent grounds parentage, without
apparent regard for the character of the relationship, if any, between two
potential parents. More specifically, the consent requirement in Buzzanca is
not grounded in an assumption compardble to the traditional assumption that
paternity can be predicated upon a man's relation to his child's mother. 6 °
The Buzzanca court did not directly ground Luanne's maternity on her
consent. . Rather, the court used that consent to establish Luanne's claim to
maternity and thereby to provide grounds for applying the intent-standard
defined in Johnson to Luanne.' 6' In Johnson, both Crispina Calvert and Anna
Johnson presented a cognizable claim to maternity. 162 That court declared that
two women have "each... presented acceptable proof of maternity.' ' 63 Only
in light of those initial proofs did the Johnson court select between the women
Beyond the health concerns generally invoked to explain that rule, the involvement of medical
professionals serves to differentiate such conception as a social matter from conception through sexual
intercourse. If a pregnancy can be defined as the consequence of a medical procedure, it is easier for the
law to deny, or at least to ignore, the actual or potential social relations-the social history-among the
parties themselves. Thus, it can seem reasonable to differentiate paternal rights and obligations in cases
involving donated semen (referred to as "surrogate fatherhood" in R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 792, 795
(Mass. 1998)) from paternal rights and obligations in cases in which a woman desiring parenthood becomes
pregnant through sexual intercourse with an otherwise uninvolved man. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224
Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986) (predicating sperm donor's paternal rights on fact that artificial insemination
was not supervised by licensed doctor).
158. Several states have promulgated legislative schemes for allowing and regulating surrogacy that
resemble statutes regulating artificial insemination. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1993);
FLA. STAT. ch. 742.15 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (1993).
159. Statutes regulating artificial insemination serve to establish paternity in a woman's husband,
and to relieve sperm donors from obligations to any resulting child. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5,
9b U.L.A. 301 (1987). In cases of artificial insemination involving married and unmarried women, the
statutes may also, at least under specified circumstances, protect the mother or the mother.and her husband
from claims of a sperm donor to paternity. See, e.g., Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
160. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (right of putative father to develop
relationship with biological child did not include right to rebut statute presuming mother's husband to be
child's father).
161. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d at 288.
162. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
163. Id.

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 23:225

on the basis of their intentions as reflected in the surrogacy agreement.
Similarly, in Buzzanca, the court established a basis for Luanne's claim to
maternity (her "consent") before it defined her as the intentional, and
therefore, legal mother to baby Jaycee.' 64
The approach contrasts with, or at least expands significantly the
assumptions undergirding the application of an intent-standard in Johnson.
In Johnson, the supreme court invoked intention to break a tie between two
women, each seen as a biological mother.'65 In Buzzanca, the appellate court
invoked Luanne's intention in order to define a woman with no biological link
to the baby as that baby's natural mother. 66
In sum, the Buzzanca court defined Luanne's consent as constituting a
ground on which to premise her maternity.'6 7 It then treated that consent as
legally equivalent to a genetic or gestational link between putative mothers
and children in other cases. In that regard, Buzzanca expands Johnson.
Johnson suggests (or assumes) that intention determines maternity only as

164. The approach depends on a curious sleight-of-hand. In fact, Luanne's consent to the surrogacy
arrangement can be differentiated only in theory from her intent as reflected in the surrogacy agreement.
The court could simply have declared Luanne the baby's mother, because she, not the gestational mother,
and not the egg donor, had demonstrated the requisite maternal intention. But, reluctant to ground
maternity exclusively on intention, the court sought an alternative base on which to identify Luanne's
maternity-her "consent." See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288.
165. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
166. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282. The Buzzanca court would seem to have misread
Johnson as having prefigured, and thus as providing for, the situation at issue in Buzzanca. The Buzzanca
court explained:
As this court noted in Jaycee B. v. Superior Court ... the Johnson court had
occasion, albeit in dicta, to address "pretty much the exact situation before us." The
language bears quoting again: "In what we must hope will be the extremely rare
situation in which neither the gestator nor the woman who provided the ovum for
fertilization is willing to assume custody of the child after birth, a rule recognizing
the intending parents as the child's legal, natural parents should best promote
certainty and stability".... This language quite literally describes precisely the case
before us now: Neither the woman whose ovum was used nor the woman who gave
birth have come forward to assume custody of the child after birth.
Id. at 290 (citations omitted). Read in context, the quoted language from Johnson speaks of a situation in
which no potential parent proves willing to bear the obligations of parenthood. The sentence in Johnson
immediately preceding the quoted language reads: "Under Anna's interpretation of the Act [an
interpretation that would define the birth mother as a child's legal mother], by contrast, a woman who
agreed to gestate a fetus genetically related to the intending parents would, contrary to her expectations, be
held to be the child's natural mother, with all the responsibilities that ruling would entail, if the intending
mother declined to accept the child after its birth. " Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Buzzanca court, in quoting from Johnson, inexplicably omits the phrase "for the child"
at the end of the quoted sentence. That sentence ends with the phrase "should best promote certainty and
stability for the child." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, clearly the Johnson court was concerned to
denominate eitherthe unwilling genetic mother or the unwilling gestational mother, depending on intent.
The court was not considering a case in which the intending mother was a third party, as in Buzzanca..
167. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288.
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between two women, each of whom is connected biologically to the child. In
contrast, Buzzanca applies the intent-standard to a woman with no biological
relation to the child involved. Thus, Buzzanca, but not Johnson, provides for
the "natural" maternity of a non-biological mother.68
In order to discern the likely limits of this ruling, it is necessary to revisit
Moschetta. There, four years before Buzzanca, the same appellate court that
decided Buzzanca established maternity in Elvira Jordan, the non-intending
"traditional" surrogate.'69 If Jordan's legal maternity was premised on her
biological maternity, then Buzzanca, like Johnson before it, is applicable to
cases involving gestational surrogacy, but not to cases involving traditional
surrogacy. On the other hand, if Moschetta was a practical response to the
facts of that case and, in particular, to the abdication of the intentional mother
in favor of a surrogate anxious to assume social maternity, then Buzzanca
might be applicable to cases occasioned by traditional surrogacy agreements.
In Moschetta itself, the court assumed that the intent-test employed in
Johnson was applicable only to cases involving more than one biological
mother:
[T]he framework employed by Johnson v. Calvert of first
determining parentage under the Act is dispositive of the case
before us. In Johnson v. Calvert our Supreme Court first
ascertained parentage under the Act; only when the operation of the
Act yielded an ambiguous result did the court resolve the matter by
intent as expressed in the agreement. In the present case, by
contrast, parentage is easily resolved in Elvira Jordan under the
terms of the Act. Here, apropos the language in Johnson v. Calvert
• . . the two usual means of showing
maternity-genetics and
0
birth-coincidein one woman.17

In distinguishing Moschetta, the Buzzanca court reiterated that
conclusion. In addition, the court suggested a different and potentially
inconsistent interpretation. First, the court reaffirmed the basic message of its

168. California statutory law provides for maternity through a relationship grounded in nature, or
through adoption. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (West 1994). As courts have constructed definitions of
maternity, these have been assimilated to one or the other of the existing models. See infra Part III
(considering "natural" versus adoption models of parentage).
169. See supra Part liB (describing Moschella). As a practical matter, it made sense in Moschetta
to name Elvira Jordan, the surrogate, and not Cynthia Moschetta, the biological father's divorcing wife, as
baby Marissa's mother. Cynthia had relinquished all claims to, and had no interest in, being declared
Marissa's mother. Thus, even if it were possible to establish parentage on the basis of intent alone, that
approach would be problematic in a case such as Moschella, in which parental intentions shifted between
the conception and birth of the baby.
170. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900 (emphasis in original).
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earlier decision in Moschetta by declaring that Elvira Jordan, the genetic and
gestational surrogate, could not be involuntarily deprived of her legal
maternity. The court proclaimed:
Our decision in In re MarriageofMoschetta ... relied on by John

[Buzzanca], is inapposite and distinguishable. In Moschetta, this
court held that a contract giving rise to a "traditional" surrogacy
arrangement where a surrogate was simply inseminated with the
husband's sperm could not be enforced against the surrogate by the
intended father. In order for the surrogate not to be the lawful
mother she would have to give the child up for adoption. 7 '
It is hard to imagine a clearer statement about the difference between
traditional surrogacy cases--cases involving only one woman with a claim to
biological maternity-and other cases involving more than one biological
mother. 12 Yet, the court almost immediately suggested an alternative
explanation of Moschetta's inapplicability: Buzzanca was different from
Moschetta because Cynthia Moschetta, the intending mother, relinquished her
interest in maternity and supported the claims of the surrogate (in opposition
to the parental claims of Cynthia's divorcing husband, Robert).'7 3 The
Buzzanca court explained:
Moschetta is inapposite because this court never had occasion to
consider or discuss whether the original intended mother's
participation in the surrogacy arrangement, which brought about the
child's birth, might have formed the basis for holding her
responsible as a parent. She had given up her claim; the issue was
not before the court. Unlike the Johnson case there was no tie to
break between two women
both of whom could be held to be
174
mothers under the Act.

Thus, possibly, a court will rely on intention to determine parentage in a future
traditional surrogacy case involving a dispute between a surrogate and an
intending mother, each anxious to be designated a legal mother. In most

171. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
172. At present, it is possible to involve three or more women in the biological reproduction of a
child. Cytoplasmic transfer makes it possible to insert the cytoplasm from one woman's ovum into another
woman's ova. Moreover, the gestational role could be shared by two or more women over time. Finally,
human embryos can in theory, and animal embryos have in fact, been combined to produce one offspring
from the gametes of four (or more) people. See Thomas D. Mays, Biotech Incites Outcry, NAT'L. L. J., June
22, 1998, at C1.
173. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288.
174. Id- at 289.
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cases, however, as an amicus brief filed in Buzzanca by the Certified Family
Law Specialists suggests, traditional surrogacy can be, and will likely continue
to be, distinguished from gestational surrogacy under existing statutory
schemes because a traditional surrogate "carr[ies] her own biological child."''
The brief argues that Buzzanca differed from Moschetta in that "[Jaycee's]
status ab initio, not the transfer
case involves the recognition of parent-child
176
of that status from one parent to another."'
In short, Buzzanca answers some of the questions raised in Johnson.
Most importantly, Buzzanca expands the applicability of intentional parentage
to at least some women lacking any claim to biological maternity. Buzzanca,
however, creates other pressing questions. Among these is the opinion's
consequence for parentage disputes in cases involving only one biological
mother. Neither the California courts nor the state legislature has addressed
this issue directly. But elsewhere, courts have consistently assumed the
maternity of women serving as traditional surrogates even
though they have
77
1
surrogates.
traditional
to
custody
granted
not
generally
III. TRADITIONAL VERSUS GESTATIONAL SURROGACY:
R.R. v. MH. AND BUZZANCA

In 1998, a Massachusetts court asked to delineate the law's position on
traditional surrogacy agreements in that state, relied on an assumption central
to virtually all decisions about traditional surrogacy-that a traditional
surrogate is the mother of the child she gestates and bears.'78 A few courts
have approved and enforced traditional surrogacy agreements,'179 and a number
175. Amicus Curiae,Association of Certified Family Law Specialists (Leslie Ellen Shear), Opening
Brief in Support of Appellant/Petitioner Jaycee B. at 32, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d
(1998) (No. 95D002992) [hereinafter Opening Brief in Support of Jaycee B.]. The appellate court appears
to have relied heavily on this brief in constructing its view of the case.
176. Id.
177. One of the first trial courts to entertain a traditional surrogacy case granted legal maternity to
the intending mother. See generally Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128. Although the trial court in Baby M did not
require the intending mother to comply with all the rules of adoption law, the court did order both
termination of the surrogate's maternity and adoption of the baby by the intending mother. Thus, the court
apparently assumed it was necessary to transfer maternity from the birth (and genetic) mother to the
intending mother.
178. See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998); see also infra notes 187-212 and
accompanying text.
179. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 214
(Ky. 1986) (approving compensated surrogacy agreement); In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d
813, 818 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1986) (approving compensated surrogacy agreement); In re Baby M, 525 A.2d
1128, 1175 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (approving surrogacy agreement, terminated surrogate's
maternal rights and ordered adoption of child by biological father's wife; state supreme court reinstated
surrogate's legal maternity). The decisions in the Kentucky and New York cases were superseded by
legislation. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie 1995) (precluding enforcement of compensated
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of states have promulgated statutes providing for and regulating such
agreements. 8 ' Almost nowhere, however, has an intending parent in a
traditional surrogacy agreement been understood implicitly or redefined
explicitly as a "natural" parent or as a parent ab initio."8' Thus, both judicial
and legislative approval of traditional surrogacy has depended upon a transfer
of parentage from the natural mother to the intending parent or parents. In
short, courts and legislatures have assumed that the biological mother is the
natural, and thus the legal mother, in cases of traditional surrogacy. Even
though the law in some jurisdictions permits such mothers to transfer
parentage to others, this statutory permission does not gainsay the biological
mother's original and essential maternity.
For instance, in Baby M, involving the attempted transfer of parentage of
a child from the traditional surrogate, Mary Beth Whitehead, to Elizabeth and
William Stem, the New Jersey trial court assumed that Whitehead was the
child's mother and that Stem was her father. 182 Thus, the court proclaimed at
the start of its long opinion:
Justice, our desired objective, to the child and the mother, to the
child and the father, cannot be obtained for both parents. The court
will seek to achieve justice for the child. This court's fact finding
the heartfelt
and application of relevant law must mitigate against
183
desires of one or the other of the natural parents.
In order to establish William and Elizabeth Stern as the child's legal parents,
the court expressly terminated Whitehead's maternal rights.'
Similarly, in Surrogate Parenting Associates v. Kentucky ex rel.
Armstrong, the Supreme Court of Kentucky clearly assumed the surrogate's
natural maternity in declaring that traditional surrogacy agreements did not
contravene state adoption laws.' 85 Consequently, the court assumed that the
potential maternity of the "wife of the biological father" depended on her

surrogacy arrangements); N.Y. DOM. REL. § 123 (McKinney 1995) (imposing civil penalty for entering into
surrogacy agreement and defining brokering surrogacy arrangement by third parties as a felony).
180. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 (Supp. 1996) (making uncompensated surrogacy
arrangements lawful); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-159, 20-160(B)(4) (Michie 1995) (making unpaid surrogacy
arrangements lawful).
181. Only Arkansas has come close to defining an intending parent as a parent from the start, and
that rule was established by the state legislature, not the judiciary. In Arkansas, statutory law creates a
presumption that a child bom as the result of a surrogacy agreement is the child of the intending parents.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b) (Michie 1993).
182. See BabyM, 525 A.2d at 1132.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 1171.
185. See SurrogateParentingAssocs., Inc., 704 S.W.2d at 214.
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adopting her husband's child. The court explained that she could "avail
herself of the legal procedure available for adoption by a stepparent."' 8 6
R.R. v. MH. reflects a similar understanding of the relationships
established by traditional surrogacy arrangements. As with Baby M, R.R.
arose as the result of a traditional surrogate's change of mind in a state
without relevant statutory rules. In November 1996, Robert and Margaret
Rascoe, anxious for a biological child, but unable to have one due to
Margaret's infertility, entered into an agreement with a surrogate, Michelle
Hoagland." 7 New England Surrogate Parenting Advisors arranged the terms
of the surrogacy for a fee of $6,000.188 The agreement provided for Hoagland
to receive $10,000 to conceive, gestate, and bear a child created from her
ovum and Robert's sperm.' 89 Hoagland further agreed that she would
surrender custody to Robert and his wife at the baby's birth. 9 ° The contract
did not provide for the termination of Hoagland's maternity, but only for her
relinquishing custody of any child who would be born as a result of the
agreement.' 9' Hoagland became pregnant in late 1996.92 Before the baby's
birth in August 1997, Hoagland informed the Rascoes that she had decided to
retain custody of the child upon its birth.'93 She returned some, but not all of
the money the baby's father had paid her.' 94 Robert Rascoe filed suit to
95
establish paternity and to clarify his rights under the surrogacy agreement.'
The child, a girl, was born on August 15, 1997.'9 Just prior to the baby's

186. Id at 210. See also Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d at 814 (describing legal transfer of maternity
from surrogate to intending mother as "private placement adoption").
187. See Emilie Astell, Surrogacy Contract Invalidated, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester), Jan.
23, 1998, at Al; H. Joseph Gitlin, Mass. Court Finds Surrogacy Agreement Unenforceable, CHICAGO
DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 13, 1998, at 5.
188. SeeR.R.,689N.E.2dat791.
189. The contract provided for Hoagland to receive $500 on becoming pregnant, $2,500 at the end
of the first trimester, $3,500 at the end of the second trimester, and an additional $3,500 at the baby's birth.
See id. at 792. The contract stated the payment was not for the right to adopt the child or for the
termination of the surrogate's parental rights. See id. The surrogate agreed to refund all money received
if she had an abortion not necessary for her health, if tests showed Rascoe wasn't the biological father, or
if Hoagland refused to surrender the child to the father at the time of its release from the hospital. See id.
190. See Astell, supra note 187, at Al.
191. Seel.R.,689N.E.2dat792.
192. See id. at 793.
193. See id.
194. When, in the sixth month of her pregnancy, Hoagland decided to keep the child, she had
received $6,600 and she repaid $3,600 to the Rascoes. See Henriette Campagne, SIC Hears Case of
SurrogateMother, MASS. LAW. WEEKLY, Oct. 13, 1997, at 2.
195. See R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 793.
196. Michelle Hoagland was listed as the child's mother on her birth certificate. Her husband,
Duanne Hoagland, was listed as the father. The couple separated during Michelle's pregnancy, apparently
as a result of Duanne's negative response to Michelle's having become a surrogate. See George Barnes,
State's Highest Court Takes Athol Surrogate-MotherCase, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester), Sept. 11,
1997, at B4.
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birth, a state court granted temporary custody of her to the Rascoes.197 At the
same time, Hoagland received the right to unsupervised visitation amounting
to twelve hours in each week.'98 An appellate court affirmed.'9 9 Before the
case reached the state's highest court, the parties entered into a voluntary
agreement under which Hoagland promised not to seek custody, and the
Rascoes agreed to arrange for periodic visits between Hoagland and the
child. 2 ° The family court approved that arrangement.2 '
As a result, Judge Wilkins' decision for the state's highest court had no
practical impact on the immediate parties. The court's concern was not with
interpreting the agreement into which Hoagland and the Rascoes had entered,
but "with the legal significance, if any, of its provisions." 2 2 In light of public
policy concerns and state adoption laws (which the court interpreted as
applicable to an agreement to terminate custodial rights), the court refused to
validate compensated surrogacy agreements.2 3 Under the state's adoption
law, a woman cannot provide binding consent to terminate her parental rights
with a view toward adoption of her child by some other party earlier than the
fourth day after the child's birth. 204 Furthermore, adoption law prohibits
payments to a birth mother beyond expenses of the birth.205 Finally,
Massachusetts law does not provide for private adoptions.20 6 In addition, the
court concluded that on public policy grounds it was unable to enforce a
contractual agreement to transfer custody of a child. 20 7 "We simply decline,"
the court declared, "on public policy grounds, to apply to a surrogacy
agreement of the type involved here the general principle that an agreement
between informed, mature adults should be enforced absent proof of duress,
fraud, or undue influence. 2 8

197. See id.Judge Ricci for the Probate and Family Court issued a preliminary injunction on the
custody and visitation question on August 1, 1997. See id.That injunction was upheld by appeals court
Judge J. Harold Flannery in mid-August. See id.All files were impounded, and lawyers for the parties were
ordered not to speak about the case. See id.
198. See Campagne, supra note 194, at 2.
199. See Barnes, supra note 196, at B4.
200. See Andrea Estes, SC: Surrogate Mons May Change Mind, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 23, 1998,
at 26.
201. See KR., 689N.E.2dat791.
202. Id. at 795. Hoagland had moved for clarification as to the legality of surrogacy agreements
in Massachusetts. The probate court had concluded that the contract among the parties was enforceable.
The state's highest court considered only this issue. See id. at 793.
203. See id.
at 797.
204. See id.
at 796.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id.
at 797.
208. Id.
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The court further declined to rely on the state's artificial insemination
law as a model for deciding whether to approve of traditional surrogacy.2"9
The situation of a sperm donor seemed too different from that of a surrogate
mother.21 The court concluded that unlike sperm donation (called "surrogate
fatherhood"), "surrogate motherhood is never anonymous and [the
surrogate's] commitment and contribution is unavoidably much greater than
that of a sperm donor." '' Thus, unlike the California court in Buzzanca, the
court in R.R. did assume an "adoption default" model. That is, in the absence
of relevant legislation, the court assumed that "when intended parents resort
to artificial reproduction without biological ties the Legislature wanted them
'
to be screened first through the adoption system."212
However, the Buzzanca court rejected an "adoption default" model in a
gestational, not a traditional, surrogacy case.2 13 Whether a future California
court or the state legislature will premise the parentage of an intending, nonbiological mother on adoption in a traditional surrogacy case remains to be
seen. Furthermore, the Massachusetts court in R.R. expressly distinguished
gestational from traditional surrogacy, and thus left open the possibility that
it too would reject an "adoption default" model in a case occasioned by
gestational surrogacy."'1 As the court proclaimed in R.R., gestational
surrogacy presents "[a] situation which involves considerations different from
those in the case before us."2 ' Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the
differences between R.R. and Buzzanca reflect differences in the fact patterns,
in particular in the technology employed in the two cases, rather than
differences in the basic perspectives of the deciding courts.
If so, R.R. and Buzzanca, read together, seem to represent an emerging
consensus about surrogacy. In fact, since the first "traditional" surrogacy
decisions in the mid-1980s, the judiciary's understandings of the familial
relationships created by such arrangements-understandings about the truths
on which parentage is grounded-have been essentially consistent." 6 Some
state courts have enforced traditional surrogacy contracts, 217 while others have
not.218 Some courts have concluded that the public policy concerns raised by
traditional surrogacy can be managed." 9 Other courts have found surrogacy
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See id. at 795.
See id.
Id.
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 289 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 282; see supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text (presenting facts of Buzzanca).
See R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 795 n.10.
Id.
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., SurrogateParentingAssocs., Inc., 704 S.W.2d at 214.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 903 (Ct. App. 1994).
See, e.g., Baby M, 525 A.2d at 1179-71.
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agreements void on the basis of those concerns. 22 ' Despite these differences,
however important as a practical matter, virtually every court that has heard
such a case has understood the facts to present a "natural" mother voluntarily
surrendering parentage or custody to a biological father and/or some third
party (often the biological father's spouse).
In contrast, courts considering disputes occasioned by gestational
surrogacy and other more complicated arrangements22 ' have not been able to
identify with certainty a child's "natural" parents-who would presumably
have to give their consent to effect an adoption. As a result, courts have
depended on an adoption model in traditional surrogacy cases and have been
ready to premise parentage on other grounds, such as parental intentions or the
best interests of the child,222 in cases occasioned by gestational surrogacy
arrangements.
The California court in Buzzanca and the Massachusetts court in R.R.
assumed that parentage can be established under the law through reliance on
either of two models. One model provides for a change in parentage while the
other does not. Courts have assumed that the first model (the adoption model)
applies to cases in which a "natural" parent agrees to transfer parentage to
some other parent or parents. Traditional surrogacy cases fall into this
category. In these cases, the status of intending parents depends on some act
that expressly transfers parentage to them from the surrogate. In other cases,
courts have assumed parentage to follow automatically in the "nature" of the
case. For instance, the California court in Johnson grounded the Calvert's
"natural" parentage on their genetic link to baby Christopher and on their
parental intentions.2 As Johnson suggests and as Buzzanca makes perfectly
clear, however, intentional parentage is not synonymous with biological
parentage. 224 The California courts referred to the Calverts and the Buzzancas
as "natural" parents.225 In fact, the Buzzancas' relationship to baby Jaycee
was no different than the relationship Margaret, the intending mother in R.R.,
had with the baby born as a result of the surrogacy arrangement at issue in that
6
case.

22

220. See, e.g., BabyM, 537 A.2d 1227, 1242 (N.J. 1988).
221. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282. In that case, neither the surrogate nor the intending
parents had a genetic connection to the resulting child.
222. In Johnson v. Calvert, Justice Kennard, in dissent, would have premised parentage on an
examination of the child's best interests. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 789 (Ca. 1993) (Kennard,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
223. See id. at 782-83.
224. See id.; Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284.
225. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285.
226. See id. at 282; R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 791.
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In fact, there are three, not two models on which society and the law
ground parentage. One model permits the transfer of parentage from one
parent or set of parents to another. This sort of parentage does not follow
automatically from a child's birth. The second assumes parentage follows
automatically from the nature of the biological case. Finally, the third model
presumes parentage at the moment of a child's birth, but as the result of legal
(cultural) presumptions and not as the result of assumptions about nature
itself. Artificial insemination statutes that presume that a consenting mother's
husband is the father of his wife's child fall within this third category.
Similarly, statutes presuming a mother's husband to be the father of that
woman's children even if the children were conceived sexually outside the
marriage, fall in the same category.
Thus, there are two paradigms for determining a child's parentage ab
initio.2 7 One predicates parentage on reproductive facts. The other predicates
parentage on presumptions about some social aspect of familial relationships.
The sort of parentage ab initio constructed in Johnson and expanded in
Buzzanca is presumptive, not biological parentage.
Recognition of the difference between presumptive and biological
parentage-each referred to in Johnson and Buzzanca as "natural"
parentage 2 28 -does not necessarily determine legal responses to cases
occasioned by reproductive technology. It does, however, obviate the
apparent need for courts (or legislatures) predicating parentage ab initio on
social facts (e.g., intentions) to re-define those social facts as ifthey were facts
of nature. Expressly recognizing presumptive parenthood ab initio as a
distinct category of legal parentage clarifies the frame within which courts and
legislatures can consider and resolve a series of basic questions about
intentional parentage that have been raised, but not yet explicitly addressed.
Central among these are questions about identifying intentions or selecting
among conflicting or shifting intentions. Once it is clear that parentage
predicated on intentions differs (if only on the ground in which it is
predicated) from parentage grounded on assumptions about biological aspects
of the reproductive process, it becomes easier to consider whether intentional
parentage must not ultimately be understood as a form of contractual
parentage. 29 If, as seems likely, that is the case, lawmakers must decide

227. The phrase "ab initio" was used in a brief presented by the Association of Certified Family
Law Specialists to the California appellate court in Buzzanca. See Opening Brief in Support of Jaycee B.,
supra note 175, at 32.
228. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
229. See Coleman, supranote 80, at 529 (decrying judicial resolution of parentage disputes in cases
occasioned by reproductive technology on basis of "superficial inquiry into 'intent"'); Dolgin, supra note
80, at 1294-95 (describing implications of reluctance of California supreme court in Johnson to recognize
intentional parentage as form of contractual parentage).
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whether or not parentage contracts will be subject to the same rules applied
to contracts more generally.
Judicial reluctance to ground parentage on contractual relations and
further blur the line between the world of family and the world of work may
account for the law's failure to explain more precisely how parental intentions
are determined. Yet, if an intent-standard survives as a device for determining
parentage in cases involving reproductive technology, it will inevitably be
necessary to acknowledge that the concept of intention involves both contract
and choice. Indeed, in other responses to the dilemmas spawned by
reproductive technology, the law appears increasingly willing to define
familial relations contractually.
23 0
IV. "[T]o HONOR THE PARTIES' EXPRESSIONS OF CHOICE": KASS V. K4SS

The commitment to contract is clearest in cases occasioned by disputes
about cryopreserved embryos or gametes. Kass, decided in 1998 by the Court
of Appeals of New York, is one such case. In Kass, the court relied on
contractual agreements to resolve a dispute that arose in the context of divorce
proceedings between Steven and Maureen Kass. The dispute involved five
embryos, produced from Maureen Kass's ova and Steven Kass's sperm, and
cryopreserved at an infertility clinic on Long Island.2 3' Rights to these
embryos remained the only unresolved issue in the couple's divorce
proceedings.
The Kass decision, much like that of the Tennessee Supreme Court in a
similar case six years earlier,232 suggests the readiness of the law to view at
least some cases involving reproductive technology outside a familial context,
and to apply contract principles in resolving such cases.

230. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998), aff'g 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997),
rev'g 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
231. The reproductive technology involved in cases such as Kass is so new that terminology
remains unsettled. The trial court referred variously to the Kass's cryopreserved "embryos" as "zygotes"
and as "pre-embryos;" the appellate division and Court of Appeals of New York used the term "pre-zygote,"
reflecting the term used in the consent agreements on the basis of which the case was ultimately decided.
The appellate division also used the term "fertilized human ova," and the court of appeals also used the tern
"pre-embryos" as an alternative term. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175; 663 N.Y.S.2d at 583; 1995 WL
110368, at *1. In Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992), the Tennessee Supreme Court used
the term "preembryos." That court commented that a French geneticist, Dr. Jerome Lejeune referred to the
"four- to eight-cell entities at issue.., as 'early human beings,' as 'tiny persons,' and as his 'kin,"' but that
Dr. Ray King, who performed the Davis IVF procedures, testified that the "currently accepted term for the
zygote immediately after division is 'preembryo' and that this term applies up until fourteen days after
fertilization." Id.
232. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. deniedsub norm. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911;
see also infra notes 279-312 and accompanying text.
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A. The Kass Decision

Maureen and Steven Kass married in 1988.233 In 1989, concerned about
Maureen's exposure in utero to diethylstilbestrol (DES), the couple sought
medical assistance to help them conceive a child.234 Between 1990 and 1993,
the Kasses attempted in vitro fertilization (IVF) ten times at the infertility
clinic of the John T. Mather Hospital on Long Island.2 35 The cost was more
than $75,000.236
All ten attempts were unsuccessful.2 37 The clinic
successfully fertilized nine ova during the last IVF procedure in May 1993.238
Doctors implanted four of the fertilized ova in the uterus of Maureen's sister,
Eileen, who had agreed to serve as a gestational surrogate.23 9 Doctors
cryopreserved the remaining five embryos. Maureen's sister did not become
pregnant.240
In July, just two months after the IVF procedure and
cryopreservation, Maureen Kass instituted a divorce action 24' and asked for
"sole custody" of the frozen embryos.242 Steven Kass, in contrast, wanted to
donate the embryos to the infertility clinic storing them.243 Steven argued that
informed consent agreements between himself and Maureen created before the
May IVF controlled. 244 Thus, those agreements protected Steven's right to
avoid procreation through use of the frozen embryos, should he so desire.245
The agreements in question, executed on May 12, 1993, consisted of four
consent forms provided by the infertility clinic and signed by the Kasses. 24

233. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175.
234. See id.
235. See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 583
236. See id.
237. See id. Maureen became pregnant twice. One pregnancy in 1991 ended in a miscarriage. A
few months later, Maureen became pregnant again, but the pregnancy was ectopic and had to be terminated.
See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176.
238. See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
239. See id.
240. After this first attempt, Maureen Kass's sister informed the couple that she no longer wanted
to serve as a gestational surrogate. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.
241. See Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *1.
242. Brief Amicus Curiae of the New York Civil Liberties Union, at 2, Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d
174 (N.Y. 1998) (No. 95-02615). Actually, Maureen did notat first seek "custody" of the embryos. In
June 1993, she and Steven prepared and signed "uncontested divorce" papers providing that the five
cryopreserved embryos should be "disposed of [in] the manner outlined in our consent form and that neither
Maureen Kass[,] Steven Kass or anyone else will lay claim to custody of these pre-zygotes." Kass, 696
N.E.2d at 177 (quotations omitted). In July, Maureen commenced the matrimonial action. At that time she
asked for "sole custody" of the five cryopreserved embryos. See id.
243. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.
244. Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 7-9, Kass (No. 95-02615); see generally Reply Brief for
Defendant-Appellant at 2, Kass (No. 95-02615) (arguing consent agreements controlled and that agreements
protected Steven Kass' right to avoid procreation).
245. See id.
246. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176.
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The first two forms--"General Informed Consent Form No. 1: In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer," and "Addendum No. 1-1"-were
connected as part of one document.247 This document explained the procedure
and its risks, and indicated that the parties would be required to make
decisions regarding the disposition of their embryos.248 The second two
forms, also connected as part of one document, consisted of "Informed
Consent Form No. 2: Cryopreservation of Human Prezygotes" and
"Addendum No. 2-1: Cryopreservation-Statement of Disposition.2 49
Language in Informed Consent Form No. 2 and its Addendum were critical to
the New York courts that rendered decisions in the case. Informed Consent
Form No. 2 provided:
In the event of divorce, we understand that legal ownership of any
stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property settlement and
will be released as directed by order of a court of competent
jurisdiction. Should we for any reason no longer wish to attempt to
initiate a pregnancy, we understand that we may determine the
disposition of our frozen pre-zygotes remaining in storage.25 °
The form further provided:
The possibility of our death or any other unforeseen circumstances
that may result in neither of us being able to determine the
disposition of any stored frozen pre-zygotes requires that we now
indicate our wishes.2
Through this form, the couple further agreed that decisions regarding the
disposition of their cryopreserved embryos would be indicated on an
addendum. Addendum No. 2-1 states:
In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are
unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of our stored,
frozen pre-zygotes, we now indicate our desire for the disposition
of our pre-zygotes and direct the IVF program to (choose one): ....

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
emphasized
262-71 and

See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.at 176.
Id.(emphasis added). The appellate division and the state's highest court relied on the
language to interpret the consent agreements as determinative in the Kass case. See infra notes
accompanying text.
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(b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program
for biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for
approved research investigation as determined by the IVF
252
Program ....

The Kasses were divorced in May 1994. Both parties agreed to a resolution

on the record of the dispute about their cryopreserved embryos.253 Thus, no
trial occurred.

The court held for Maureen, giving her the right "to take possession to
the five zygotes presently in the possession of the John T. Mather Hospital In
Vitro Fertilization Program for purposes of attempting conception.
Justice
Roncallo's decision for the trial court depended on his equating in vitro with
in vivo fertilization and then invoking a woman's constitutional right to

abort, 255 or not to abrt156
abort, a pregnancy.

The trial court's conclusions were also premised on a particular
understanding of the ontological status of the embryos. The court explained:

"The rights of the parties are dependent upon the nature of the zygote not the
stage of its development or its location. 2 57 The court explained further, "[i]f
the wife is awarded possession the preembryos will be afforded an opportunity

252. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176-77 (quotations omitted). In addition to option "b" (to donate the
embryos to the infertility clinic for "approved research") selected by the Kasses, the form provided two
other options. The first provided for donation "to another infertile couple as determined by the IVF
Program." The second alternative provided for the embryos to be "thawed, fixed and disposed of by the
IVF Program." Record on Appeal, Exhibit 2 to Kass Affidavit and Stempel Affirmation-Informed
Consent Form No. 2, at 523-24, Kass (No. 95-02615).
253. Record on Appeal, at 473, Kass (No. 95-02615) (letter from Vincent Stempel (attorney for
Steven Kass) to Honorable Angelo Roncallo, Supreme Court of the State of New York, Jan. 9, 1995
agreeing to determination by trial court upon submissions and noting agreement of Linda Armatti, Esq.
(attorney for Maureen Kass)).
254. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *5.
255. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (granting women limited right to abortion).
256. The court asserted: "Just as an in vivo husband's 'right to avoid procreation' is waived and
ceases to exist after intercourse in a coital reproduction, such right should be deemed waived and nonexistent after his participation in an in vitro program." Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2. Justice Roncallo
supported this assertion through reference to the procreative rights guaranteed to pregnant women under
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (granting limited constitutional right to abortion), and Planned
Parenthoodof CentralMo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (granting woman constitutional right to
abort despite husband's opposition "[i]nasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who
is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy ....
").Both of those cases, however,
concerned the fights ofjpregnant women. All of the higher court judges who reviewed the case agreed that
the dispute between the two could not be resolved by treating Maureen as if'she were pregnant. Justice
Miller asserted, "[iut is noteworthy that my colleagues and I are in unanimous agreement ... that the
Supreme Court erred in equating a woman's procreational right to attain pregnancy via in vitro fertilization
with her right to bodily autonomy attendant to an in vivo pregnancy." Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 594 (Miller,
J., dissenting). See also Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.
257. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *3.
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to realize their potential; if the husband is successful such potential will be
extinguished as part of a scientific inquiry. 258
Despite the court's concern with the embryos' status and
essence-representing "the ultimate in nascency and potentiality" 2 59-Justice
Roncallo declared that he would have honored an unambiguous contractual
agreement indicating the parties' wishes regarding disposition of the embryos
in the event of divorce.260 Justice Roncallo concluded that the existing
26 1
agreements did not do that.
On appeal, a plurality of the appellate division disagreed, and found the
consent agreements determinative. 262 Finally, the state's highest court,
affirmed the appellate division's decision and resolved the dispute between
the Kasses by reference to their consent agreements.263 The court declared,
258. Id. at *2.
259. Id.
260. See id. at *4.
261. In addition, Justice Roncallo determined that the "uncontested divorce" agreement into which
the parties entered in June 1993, but which never became operative, did not constitute a waiver of Maureen
Kass's "right to determine the future of the subject zygotes." Id. at *5.
In fact, the two higher courts that rendered decisions in Kass each recognized a potential ambiguity
in the consent forms. Informed Consent Form No. 2 provided that in the event of divorce "legal ownership
of any pre-stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed
by an order of a Court of competent jurisdiction." Id. at *4. The trial court interpreted that language to
grant the divorce court the right to decide as between the wishes of the divorcing parties concerning the
frozen embryos. The higher courts disagreed and found that the consent forms disposed of the issue
presented in the case. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
262. See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 583. Justice Sullivan, writing for the court's plurality, interpreted
the phrase "unforeseen circumstances" for which the parties provided in the Addendum No. 2-1
("Cryopreservation-Statement of Disposition") to Informed Consent Form No. 2, to include the divorce
proceedings in which they were in fact involved. Id. at 588. Justice Sullivan further concluded that the
provision in the consent agreements that did expressly mention divorce was not dispositional, but was
instead intended to confer jurisdiction on the court, and, thereby, to protect the infertility clinic from
liability, should a dispute between the parties arise in the context of divorce. See id. at 589. Justice
Friedmann, who concurred, did not find the contractual language adequately decisive to justify relying on
it. Justice Friedmann's concurrence followed from his conclusion, that in the absence of unambiguous
contractual agreements, in cases such as Kass, "the objecting party, except in the most exceptional
circumstance, should be able to veto a former spouse's proposed implantation." Id. at 592. Justice
Friedmann's position was in harmony with that suggested by the New York State Task Force on Life and
Law. That body concluded in a 1998 report that "when two people have joint decision-making authority
over a frozen embryo, one person's objection to transferring the embryo for implantation, destroying it, or
using it for research should take precedence over the other person's consent." THE NEW YORK STATE TASK
FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 317 (1998).

TECHNOLOGIES:

ANALYSIS

AND

Justice Miller, who dissented in the appellate division, agreed with Justice Friedmann that the consent
agreements were not clear enough to direct resolution of the parties' dispute. She did not, however, agree
that a party objecting to use of the embryos for reproduction should be favored. Rather, she would have
remitted the case for a full hearing. Specifically, she would have asked the trial court to consider "the
competing fundamental, personal rights of both parties" and to balance those rights "utilizing a factsensitive analysis." Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 599 (Miller, J. dissenting).
263. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 182.
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"[a]greements between progenitors.., should generally be presumed valid
and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them."2 ' Specifically, the
court concluded, in line with the decision of the appellate division, that the
consent agreements were not in fact marred by ambiguity.265
The court considered the problematic sentence in Informed Consent Form
No. 2, which provided that "[i]n the event of divorce, we understand that legal
ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property
settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of competent
jurisdiction. 266 Judge Kaye declared that the court could not interpret that
sentence as providing that a court should determine legal ownership of the
embryos.267 The court concluded that the construction, which Maureen Kass
had suggested, "ignores the direction that ownership of the pre-zygotes 'must
be determined in a property settlement'-words that also must be given
meaning, words that connote the parties' anticipated agreement as to
disposition.,,26' Furthermore, Judge Kaye explained that Addendum No. 2-1,
which the Kasses had signed, "was not strictly limited to instances of 'death
or other unforseen circumstances.,' 2 69 In short, the court concluded:
As they embarked on the IVF program, appellant and
respondent-'husband' and 'wife,' signing as such--clearly
contemplated the fulfillment of a life dream of having a child during
their marriage. The consents they signed provided for other
contingencies, most especially that in the present circumstances the
pre-zygotes would be donated to the IVF program for approved
research purposes.270
As a result of its straightforward reliance on the consent agreements into
which the Kasses had entered, the court almost completely avoided addressing
the issues of greatest moment to the trial court-the significance of a
constitutional right to determine procreative behavior as well as questions
relating to the ontological status of the embryos.2 7'

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 180.
See id. at 182.
Id. at 176.
See id. at 182.
Id. at 181
Id. at 182 (quoting parties' consent agreement, Addendum No. 2-1).
Id.
Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *2-3.
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B. The Implications of Kass
Unquestionably, one of the most important aspects of Kass was the
willingness of all thirteen New York judges who participated in the case 272 to
recognize and enforce contractual agreements delineating the parties' wishes
for cryopreserved embryos. Justice Miller, who dissented from the plurality
decision of the appellate division, suggested that the case be remitted for
analysis of the parties' procreational rights. 273 He proposed implementation
of a legislative mandate requiring parties undergoing IVF and contemplating
the cryopreservation of embryos to enter into contractual agreements
delineating their intentions. 274 Even Justice Roncallo-whose opinion for the
trial court relied on the constitutionally protected procreational rights of a
pregnant woman, and the particular status attributed to the embryos275 -would
permit progenitors to waive their constitutional rights, apparently as well as
any rights (moral or legal) implied by the "nascency and potentiality" of the
embryos, by indicating their own intentions in contractual form.276
In short, even those judges most anxious to stress the familial setting of
the dispute between the Kasses were ready to acknowledge and enforce the
provisions of an unambiguous contract. 77 This consensus is especially
remarkable given the wide differences in the courts' (and individual
judges') 278 conclusions about how best to resolve disputes over cryopreserved
embryos in the absence of contractual agreements.
In this regard, the attention that each court gave to the 1992 decision of
the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis is significant. Indeed, many
2 79
of the implications of Kass emerge clearly through consideration of Davis.

272. Justice Roncallo wrote a decision for the trial court. Kass, 1995 WL 110368. Justice Sullivan
wrote the plurality opinion of the appellate division in which Justice Copertino concurred. See Kass, 663
N.Y.S.2d 581. Justice Friedmann wrote a separate concurrence. See id. at 591. Justice Miller, joined by
Justice Altman, dissented. See id. at 594, 602. Judge Kaye wrote the opinion of the Court of Appeals of
New York and Judges Bellacosa, Ciparick, Levine, Smith, Titone, and Wesley concurred. Kass, 696
N.E.2d at 175, 182.
273. See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 594. (Miller, J., dissenting).
274. See id
275. See supra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.
276. Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *4. In this regard, Justice Roncallo's decision differed significantly
from the Tennessee trial court in Davis v. Davis. There, the court viewed the embryos as "human beings."
Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *2 (Blount County Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989).
Accordingly, the court based its decision on a determination of the embryos' "best interests." Id.
277. Justice Roncallo for the trial court as well as Justice Friedmann, concurring, and Justices
Miller and Altman, dissenting from the appellate division's plurality decision, all found the contract too
uncertain to be relied upon in resolving the dispute. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 262.
279. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588. At present, only two state high courts-Tennessee and New
York-have rendered decisions in cases involving disputes about cryopreserved embryos between
progenitors. See id.; see also Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174. A few such cases have been considered by lower state
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Davis arose as part of divorce proceedings between Junior and Mary Sue
Davis.18 ' The Davises, much like the Kasses after them, agreed on all aspects
of their divorce except for the fate of seven cryopreserved embryos.2"8' The
embryos, produced from Mary Sue's eggs and Junior's sperm, were
cryopreserved in 1988 in a Knoxville infertility clinic where the Davises had
been treated.' 8 '
The Tennessee Supreme Court expressly considered the status of the
Davises' embryos.283 Rejecting both the trial court's conclusion that the
embryos were "persons," and the suggestion of the intermediate appellate
court that they were "property," the supreme court defined them as worthy of
"special respect" due to their "potential for human life.

' 28 4

But then, having

established the need for deference to the embryos' potentiality, the court
ordered them discarded.285 The court never referred to or commented on the
transparent inconsistency between its definition of the embryos and its holding
in the case.286
After defining the embryos' status, the court turned to the immediate
dispute.28 ' The Davis agreement, unlike the Kass agreement, did not direct the
disposition of the embryos should the couple choose not to use them in the

progenitors. See id; see also Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174. A few such cases have been considered by lower state
courts. In June, 1998, a Michigan trial court decided that five frozen embryos, claimed by each of their
divorcing progenitors, were not children and that the father had the right not to have the embryos gestated.
See Karl Leif Bates, Dad Wins Embryo-Court Fight,DETROIT NEWS, June 25, 1998, at C 1.Judge Kaye's
decision in Kass notes an ongoing New Jersey case involving a dispute between the divorcing progenitors
of cyropreserved embryos. The husband desired to have the embryos available "for implantation in a future
spouse." The divorcing wife objected. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179 n.3 (citing Michael Booth, Fate of Frozen
Embryos Brings N.J. Again to Bioethics Fore: With No Precedent, Court to Decide on Request to Destroy
Fertilized Ova, N.J.L.J., Mar. 9, 1998, at 1). See also Evelyn Apgar, Frozen Embryos: New Custody
Battlefield, N.J. LAW., Apr. 27, 1998, at 5 (describing cases pending before New Jersey Court regarding
parental rights and embryos).
280. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 592.
283. See id. at 594.
284. Id. at 597.
285. See notes 294-97 infra (noting Junior Davis's disposal of embryos).
286. The court did note that under Webster v. Reproductive HealthServs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) and
even under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a "state's interest in potential human life may justify statutes
or regulations that have an impact upon a person's exercise of procreational autonomy." But the court
concluded that there was no such relevant state's interest because state law provided no ground for
"infringing on gamete-providers' decisional authority over the preembryos to which they have contributed."
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602.
The Davis court's delineation of the status of the embryos seems to have had no practical
consequence. Perhaps the court would not have considered the status issue at all had the case not inevitably
implicated the abortion debate. That debate has involved extensive, and generally inconclusive commentary
on the biology of embryonic development. See DOLGIN, supra note 20, at 163-73 (considering definition
of embryos' status in Davis in light of holding in case).
287. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.
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effort to produce a pregnancy.288 Yet the Davis court concluded that, had such
an agreement existed, it would have been dispositive.2 9 The court asserted:
We believe, as a starting point, that an agreement regarding
disposition of any untransferred preembryos in the event of
contingencies (such as the death of one or more of the parties,
divorce, financial reversals, or abandonment of the program) should
be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the
progenitors. This conclusion is in keeping with the proposition that
the progenitors, having provided the gametic material giving rise to
the preembryos, retain decision-making authority as to their
disposition.290
In a subtle twist, the "special respect" owed the embryos has been transferred
to the gamete progenitors.2 9'
The court immediately proceeded to examine the "right to privacy"
enjoyed by the progenitors under the federal and state constitutions. 2 92 No
state interest existed that would justify infringing on the "freedom of these
individuals to make their own decisions" about the cryopreserved embryos at
issue in the case. 293 The court therefore examined the parties' respective
interests, 294 balancing Junior Davis's interest in avoiding procreation against
Mary Sue's interest in donating the embryos to an infertile coup!e. 295 As a
result, the court held in Junior's favor.296 In June 1993, the embryos were

288. See id at 590.
289. See id. at 597.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 598-99.
293. Id. at 602.
294. Id. at 603.
295. When the litigation began, Mary Sue wanted to have the embryos implanted in her own uterus.
During the course of the litigation, she remarried, moved out-of-state, and decided that she no longer
desired to become pregnant with the embryos produced from her own and her former husband's gametes.
See Brief for Appellee at 13, Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Initial Brief for Appellant at
8, Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 [hereinafter Davis Appellant Brief]. At first, Junior requested that the embryos
be stored indefinitely. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589. At the time, indefinite storage was understood as
"tantamount to the destruction of the embryos." Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *36. Dr. Charles
A. Shivers, an embryologist who testified at the Davis trial, stated that despite success freezing mice
embryos over longer periods, human embryos had not been frozen for more than two years and then
successfully thawed. See id. at *70 (summarizing testimony of witnesses). Later, Junior Davis asked that
the embryos be discarded. Davis Appellant Brief, supra, at 8.
296. The Davis court explained:
Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the
other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than
the use of the preembryos in question. If no other reasonable alternatives exist,
then... argument[s] in favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should
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transmitted from the infertility clinic in Knoxville to Junior Davis who
announced that he had had the embryos destroyed.297
Finally, the Davis court, having balanced the parties' interests only
because the parties had not reached agreement about disposition of the
embryos, delineated a general framework within which to resolve cases
involving disputes between the progenitors of cryopreserved embryos:
In summary, we hold that disputes involving the disposition of
preembryos produced by in vitro fertilization should be resolved,
first, by looking to the preferences of the progenitors. If their
wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior
agreement concerning disposition should be carried out. If no prior
agreement exists, then the relative interests of 298
the parties in using
or not using the preembryos must be weighed.
This framework, the first constructed by a state's highest court concerning a
dispute related to the disposition of cryopreserved embryos, has been widely
and approvingly cited by commentators and courts addressing disputes
involving reproductive technology and other reproductive matters.299
Moreover, Davis provided the framework within which New York's appellate
courts approached Kass, and it was cited approvingly by the trial court in
Kass, despite that court's different approach to the Kass dispute. 00
Among judges, there is broad, though not unanimous, acceptance of a
contractual approach in cases involving disputes about cryopreserved
be considered. However, if the party seeking control of the preembryos intends
merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting party obviously has the
greater interest and should prevail.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
297. See Mark Curriden, Embryo Fight Yields Few Answers: DisposalDisclosed: Embryos Are
Discardedin a Tennessee Case, but Legal and Ethical QuestionsRemain, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 14,
1993, at Al.
298. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
299. See, e.g., Valley Hosp. Ass'n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coalition, 948 P.2d 963, 967 (Alaska 1997)
(holding Article 1, Section 22 of Alaska Constitution to include reproductive rights); Belsito v. Clark, 644
N.E.2d 760, 760 (Ohio C.P. 1994) (noting importance of choice in use of reproductive technology); Hecht
v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Ct. App. 1993) (upholding rights of progenitors to
cryopreserved gametes and embryos); MMMA v. Jonely, 677 So. 2d 343, 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(defining parental rights as part of right to privacy in dispute between mother and couple wishing to adopt
child).
Law review articles citing Davis include: Judith Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies:
Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 Hous. L. REv. 609, 622 (1997); Meena Lal, Comment, The Role of the
FederalGovernment in Assisted Reproductive Technologies,Comment, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 517, 526-27 (1997); A. Gunsburg, Note, Frozen Life's Dominion:Extending Reproductive
Autonomy Rights to In Vitro Fertilization,65 FORDHAM. L. REV. 2205, 2207 (1997); John A. Robertson,
Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 917 (1996).
300. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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gametic"' and embryonic material.0 2 Almost all the judges who wrote
decisions for the six state courts that considered Davis or Kass actually relied
on, or would have preferred relying on, a contractual approach. 3 Thus, these
courts were willing, even if only implicitly, to amalgamate the laws regulating
embryo cryopreservation with the laws of the marketplace. Family law, with
its traditional concern for protecting holistic social units, is simply absent
from the courts' decisions. In its place is an approach that assumes the right
of autonomous individuals to negotiate their own realities.
Moreover, in the absence of a contractual agreement, the Tennessee
Supreme court in Davis relied on an approach-generally categorized as an
aspect of family law or family constitutional law-which assumed the
disputing progenitors to have been autonomous individuals. Thus, the court
took the independent person, rather than the family, as a social whole as the
unit of legal analysis. The court delineated the progenitors' reproductive
rights (understood as part of the "right to privacy") and balanced the rights of
each progenitor against those of the other.3" For the most part, these rights,
as defined in a broad set of United States Supreme Court decisions between
the early 1970s and the present, are applicable to autonomous individuals, not
to family members taken as a group.3"5 So, for instance, in Eisenstadt v.
Baird,the Supreme Court premised an extension of the right to contraception
by unmarried persons on the understanding that the right to privacy "is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the

301. See, e.g., Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 226.
302. An exception is Judge Young,. the trial court judge in Davis. Judge Young implicitly rejected
a contractual approach by defining the embryos at issue as children and by proceeding to consider those
embryos' "best interests." Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *2. However, the assumptions on which
that decision was grounded contrast dramatically with the assumptions behind most decisions about related
issues. Judge Young relied heavily on the testimony of one expert witness, Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a French
geneticist, who testified for Mary Sue Davis at trial. Dr. Lejeune discovered the chromosome responsible
for Down's syndrome. See ProfessorJerome Lejeune (obituary), THE TIMES (London), Apr. 7, 1994, at
21. In 1974 he was appointed by the Pope as a member of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. See id
Before testifying in Davis, he had worked to make abortions illegal. See id
Dr. Lejeune testified that cryopreserved embryos are human beings and then concluded: "[L]ove is
the contrary [sic] of chilly. Love is warmth .... [T]he best we can do for early human beings is to have
them in their normal shelter, not in the fridge." Transcript of Proceedings, Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496
(Tenn. Circ. Ct. Aug. 10, 1989), Vol. III, at 51.
Justice Roncallo, who shared Judge Young's broad approach, expressly premised his decision on
Maureen Kass's procreational autonomy and did not find that the preembryos were human. Accordingly,
he declared that he would have decided the case differently had he been convinced that Maureen Kass had
waived her rights through a pre-IVF consent form or in another legal document. Kass, 1995 WL 110368,
at *2, *5 (reviewing consent forms and "uncontested divorce" agreement). See supranote 261.
303. See supra note 302 (noting position of Judge Young for the trial court in Davis).
304. See supra notes 292-95
305. See DOLGIN, supra note 20, at 57-59.
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decision whether to bear or beget a child."3 °6 This understanding, though
familiar in a world of contract and commerce, was revolutionary when applied
to the family in the early 1970s. Despite broad acceptance for the new
understanding of family outlined in Eisenstadt in the intervening decades,
society and the law remain ambivalent about expressly abandoning traditional
understandings of family." 7 That ambivalence has emerged, among other
places, in a continuing tendency to disguise the individualism that undergirds
the law of reproductive rights.
A subtle instance of that tendency appears in Judge Kaye's consideration
in Kass of the approach to reproductive rights outlined in Davis.3"' The
instance is especially noteworthy in that Judge Kaye, herself, defined the
rights involved in Kass in straightforward contractual terms.30 9 Judge Kaye
described the Davis approach:
Having declared that embryos are entitled to 'special respect
because of their potential for human life[,]' Davis recognized the
procreative autonomy of both gamete providers, which includes an
interest in avoiding genetic parenthood as well as an interest in
becoming a genetic parent.310
The implied connection between the Davis court's characterization of the
embryos' status and that court's focus on the progenitors' procreative rights
suggests lingering hesitation about abandoning a family law approach in such
cases. Family law, not contract law, is motivated by a concern for status and
relationship. In fact, as the specific holding in Davis shows, the implication
of a causal connection between the embryos' status and the progenitors'
reproductive rights is illusory. The court in Kass was content to rely on the
consent agreements into which the Kasses had entered, and expressly
dismissed any need to consider the status of the embryos.3 " Thus, both broad
approaches suggested by Davis (depending on contract law) and approved in

306. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
307. See DOLGIN, supra note 20, at 39-57 (analyzing ideological differences between the Supreme
Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and in Eisenstadtv. Baird,405 U.S.
438 (1972).
308. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178.
309. See id.
310. Id.(citing Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597) (internal citations omitted).
311. See id. at 179. The Court of Appeals of New York proclaimed:
The relevant inquiry thus becomes who has dispositional authority over [the prezygotes]. Because that question is answered in this case by the parties' agreement,
for purposes of resolving the present appeal we have no cause to decide whether the
pre-zygotes are entitled to "special respect."
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Kass (depending on privacy law) assume that the rights belong to autonomous
individuals, not to family members as participants in larger kin groupings.
In sum, the emphasis in Davis on the litigants as autonomous individuals
is even more apparent and certain in Kass. Davis, by invoking the embryos'
ontological status and in relying on the parties' procreative rights, at least
suggests a familial context. Kass relies more transparently on a contract
approach. The court recognized, interpreted, and then simply enforced the
contractual agreements into which the parties had entered. These cases
suggest ajudiciary ready, even anxious, to rely on principles of contract law,
rather than of family law, in resolving disputes about the disposition of
cryopreserved embryos and gametes.3" 2
V. FROM "MOTHER" TO PARENTAL INTENTIONS To CONTRACT

Within two decades, courts have reached a flexible consensus about
resolving disputes occasioned by reproductive technology. The consensus reflects
a culture struggling to both preserve traditional understandings of family and to
respect the right of autonomous individuals to make their own choices and to
design their own lives. In re MarriageofBuzzanca,1 3 RR?1 v. MH.3 14 and Kass
v. Kass,3" 5 as well as earlier cases on which these decisions relied either explicitly
or implicitly31 6 indicate the scope and character of this evolving consensus.

312. This tendency is not limited to cases involving divorcing progenitors, where, it might be
argued, the only family involved is disintegrating and thus need not be considered. For example, in York
v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425-26 (E.D. Va. 1989), a federal district court in Virginia defined the
relationship between a married couple, progenitors of cryopreserved embryos, and the medical facility
where their embryos were stored as that of bailor-bailee. In ordering the Virginia medical facility to comply
with the progenitors' wishes and transfer the embryos to another fertility clinic, the court relied on terms
of the Cryopreservation Agreement between the couple and the facility. See also Del Zio v. Columbia
Presbyterian Hosp., No. 74 Civ. 3588, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978) (awarding
female IVF patient damages for destruction of her eggs).
313. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
314. R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998).
315. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
316. Other decisions involving gestational surrogacy include Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d. 760
(Ohio C.P. 1994) (declaring genetic parents the legal and natural parents of child born to gestational
surrogate; surrogate was sister of genetic mother; no dispute existed among parties); Soos v. Superior
Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding unconstitutional Arizona surrogacy statute that
conclusively presumed gestational surrogate legal mother of child); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782
(Cal. 1993) (denominating genetic, intentional parents as legal, natural parents).
Cases involving "traditional" surrogacy include In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)
(invalidating surrogacy contract; giving custody to biological father and visitation to surrogate, biological
mother); Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky ex rel.Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986)
(holding surrogate parenting contract voidable but not void; distinguishing between surrogacy and buying
and selling children); In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1986) (holding
surrogacy contracts voidable if terms violated state adoption laws); Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1981) (holding constitutional right to bear child included right to enter surrogacy agreement for
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A. A Legal Framework
R.R., Buzzanca, and Kass represent a continuum of responses. In PR,
the Massachusetts court refused to enforce a contract to determine a child's
custody or parentage entered into by the biological, surrogate mother and the
biological (intending) father.317 Moreover, the court expressly rejected
reliance on statutes promulgated to regulate artificial insemination (called
"surrogate fatherhood" by the court).318 The court justified that decision on
the basis of perceived differences between "surrogate fatherhood" and
"surrogate motherhood."3 9 Therein the court concluded that although
fatherhood can be automatically transferred from one man to another through
the medium of consent, motherhood belongs to a child's biological motherher agreements and apparent intentions notwithstanding.32
The law already provides for the transfer of parenthood for both mothers
and fathers to other men or women through adoption statutes.3 21 But under
adoption statutes the transfer of parentage is a function of state action, and
cannot be effected through parental intention and agreement alone.3 22 The
Massachusetts court in RR refrained from prohibiting surrogacy altogether,
but instead premised the transfer of parentage from the surrogate mother to the
intending parent or parents on compliance with state adoption law.323 So, for
instance, consent given before the fourth day after the birth carries no legal
consequence.324 Further, payment to a surrogate is illegal, beyond that given
to cover pregnancy-related expenses. 325 In short, so-called "traditional"
surrogacy will be tolerated, but only insofar as it complies with the rules
delineated in state adoption law. Surrogacy arrangements become, in effect,
adoptions arranged before conception, but without any guarantees until the
parties have complied with the provisions of relevant adoption laws.

money in state with adoption laws forbidding payment of money for child). Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588 (Tenn. 1992), is the only other decision about cryopreserved embryos by a state's highest court.
317. See R.R, 689 N.E.2d at 797. The decision was moot since the biological parents had settled
the dispute between them and that settlement received judicial approval. See supra notes 202-08 and
accompanying text.
318. RR., 689 N.E.2d at 795; see also supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
319. R.R., 689N.E.2d at 795.
320. See id.
321. Every state has a statute providing for adoption. These statutes require termination (either
voluntary or involuntary) of the rights of the original parent or parents before an adoption can occur. In
most states, the establishment of the new parent-child relationship requires ajudicial proceeding. LESLIE
J.HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 1165 (1996).

322.
323.
324.
325.

See
See
See
See

id.
B.B., 689 N.E.2d at 796.
id.
id.

274

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 23:225

In contrast, the California court in Buzzanca provided for creation of
parentage, without reference to state adoption laws, in a mother and a father,
neither of whom was linked biologically to the child involved.326 The
Buzzancas' parentage was premised on their intent to conceive, carry, and
bear the child in question.32 ' Especially in comparison with PR., the decision
is useful in delineating and considering the truths on which society grounds
parentage, in that the intending mother in Buzzanca expressly refused to
initiate adoption proceedings.32 Had she done so, she would almost certainly
have become baby Jaycee's legal mother, since neither the gestational, nor the
genetic mother was available for and interested in that role. Luanne, the
intending mother, rejected adoption and hoped instead to be named the child's
"natural" mother under California law.329 In holding for Luanne, the
California court significantly expanded the applicability of intentional
parentage as delineated in Johnson.330
Arguably, the court's reliance on parental intention in Johnson depended
on each potential mother's cognizable claim to biological maternity. In
Buzzanca, in contrast, Luanne made no claim to biological motherhood. Thus,
several essential differences separate the facts of Buzzanca from those of R.R.
First, the surrogate in Buzzanca was connected to the child only through the
gestational relationship, and not genetically. Second, Buzzanca was a dispute
between an intending mother and an intending father, whereas in R.R. the
surrogate was opposed by the intending parents. Finally, R.R. involved too
many parents, whereas Buzzanca involved too few. Each of these facts
appeared to influence the Buzzanca court. Whatever its motivations, however,
the court clearly extended intentional parentage to include a couple
unconnected biologically to the child involved. Thus, the court established a
new ground on which to predicate maternity-one that depended neither on
biological connections nor on compliance with state adoption laws.33'
Finally, in Kass, New York's highest court depended directly on
contractual agreements to resolve the dispute between Steven and Maureen
Kass over the disposition of their cryopreserved embryos. After reviewing the

326. See generally Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280.
327. See id. at 291.
328. See id. at 283.
329. See id. The decision was motivated, at least in part, by her desire to have John Buzzanca
named the child's father. Only in that way would John become liable for child support payments. Luanne
explained: " If [John] doesn't want to be an active father in her life, that's his business and that's, I guess,
his privilege .... But on the other hand, my daughter was brought into this world by two people who
committed to each other and to her that they would take care of her until she was 18." 48 Hours,supra note
135.
330. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
331. State statutes regulating artificial insemination already allowed the creation of paternity in a
non-biological father without requiring compliance with laws regulating adoption. See supra notes 157-59.
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facts, the decisions of the courts below, and approaches to the disposition of
cryopreserved embryos proposed by other courts and commentators, the court
of appeals turned to the informed consent documents. Finding that those
documents "clearly expressed [the Kasses'] intent,, 332 and concluding that
such agreements "should generally be presumed valid and binding,'1 33 the
court affirmed the decision of the appellate division, and ordered that the
cryopreserved embryos be made available to the IVF clinic "for approved
research investigation. 334
In sum, courts are interpreting cases involving reproductive technology
within a broad, flexible framework. That framework encompasses three
discrete approaches. The first, represented by PKR., most fully resembles the
approach within which the law responded to and regulated the traditional
family. The second, represented by Buzzanca, presumes an affinity with the
first, but in fact premises parentage on choice. Finally, the third, represented
by Kass, openly treats disputes concerning reproductive technology as the law
generally treats disputes in the marketplace-by interpreting contractual
arrangements into which the parties entered.
B. Implicationsof the Legal Framework: Understandingsof Family
The three different approaches used in R.R., Buzzanca, and Kass to
develop the legal framework broadly follow the legal approaches applied to
family matters in general. A traditional understanding of family survives, but
has been replaced in significant part by a view that treats family members as
autonomous individuals, free to design their own relationships, as well as the
termination of those relationships. Increasingly, courts recognize and enforce
contractual agreements into which family members have entered much as they
recognize and enforce agreements among business associates. 3 5 This is
especially true in disputes primarily involving relationships between adult
family members. 36 In cases more directly implicating the status and welfare

332. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178.
333. Id. at 180.
334. Id. at 177 (quoting "Informed Consent Form No. 2-Addendum No. 2-1:
Cryopreservation-Statement of Disposition," Section 2 (b)).
335. For instance, in the second half of the twentieth century, courts widely began to recognize and
enforce ante-nuptial agreements. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1998); Osborne v.
Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 1981); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970), as well as
cohabitation agreements, see, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Morone v. Morone, 413
N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980). Similarly, the so-called "divorce revolution," involved the replacement of"fault"
as the only ground for divorce with a broader scheme that allows for divorce if the parties so desire. See
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204-07 (2d ed. 1985). See generally LENORE
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985).

336. See DOLGIN, supra note 20, at 34-35.
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of children, the law has been far slower to surrender traditional understandings
of family embedded in truths that transcend, and thus cannot be disrupted by,
individual family members' shifting needs and desires... So, for instance,
divorce courts refrain from automatic acceptance of parents' agreements about
the continued custody of their children after parental separation. In this
context, the "best interests of the child" have been and largely remain the
"judicial yardstick used to measure all claims for children.133 Between these
two approaches is a third. This third approach, much like that in Johnson and
Buzzanca, expressly defines familial relationships as distinct from
relationships in the marketplace, but ultimately upholds the choices of family
members as autonomous individuals. Much of the law that defines and
339
protects family members' privacy rights reflects this approach.
Analysis of the similarities and differences among IKR., Buzzanca, and
Kass suggests some of the express, as well as some of the more tacit,
assumptions underlying the law's willingness to differentiate among various
familial relationships. The approach of the California court in Buzzanca
proves pivotal to this analysis.
On the one hand, Buzzanca resembles Kass in that the court relied on
parental intentions and privileged choice over biology. Inevitably intentions
are the affiliates of contract, any notion that the approach in Buzzanca (and
Johnson before it) differs significantly from the approach in Kass (with its
express reliance on contractual agreements) will likely prove illusory.
Reliance on intent is, in effect, reliance on contract. Buzzanca and Johnson
struggle to sustain and to reflect traditional familial sentiments, but each case
sides ultimately with choice-and thus with a world defined through contract.
Indeed, the Buzzanca court explicitly invoked the couple's consent to the
conception of Jaycee as evidence of some parental connection-as the
prerequisite needed underJohnson to justify application of the intent standard.
On the other hand, Buzzanca resembles R.R in that the Buzzanca court
refrained from expressly enforcing the contract.34 ° The court, following the
model established in Johnson, relied on the contract to determine the parties'
intentions, but did not enforce the contract. 34' "There is," the Buzzanca court
proclaimed, "a difference between a court's enforcing a surrogacy agreement
and making a legal determination based on the intent expressed in a surrogacy

337. See id.
338. GROSSBERG, supra note 16, at 239 (describing construction of that "yardstick" during early
decades of the nineteenth century).
339. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977).
340. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289.
341. See id.
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agreement.""
Like the Johnson court, whose model it followed, the
Buzzanca court was reluctant to rely directly on a contract to determine
parentage. Thus, the court looked to the contract, but refrained from actually
enforcing it.
In short, the court avoided transparently invoking the world of contract
as the basis for determining familial relationships. Instead, it constructed a
more opaque response that achieved the same end, while.refraining from an
explicit amalgamation of the world of contract and the world of family. More
specifically, by differentiating "intentional" parentage from parentage based
on a contractual agreement, the courts in Johnson and Buzzanca were able to
presume, and thus to proclaim, that a child's best interests are served at least
as adequately by "intending" as by "biological" parents.343 Indeed, the court
in Johnson, borrowing language from several commentators, portrayed
intending parents as especially suited to the parental role:
The mental concept of the child is a controlling factor of its
creation, and the originators of that concept merit full credit as
conceivers.
The mental concept must be recognized as
independently valuable; it creates expectations in the initiating
parents of a child, and it creates expectations in society for adequate
performance on the part of the initiators as parents of the child. 3"
By equating intentional parentage with protection of a child's best interests,
the court presumed to protect familial relationships from unmediated
incursions by the law of the marketplace. Yet, as a practical matter, reliance
on intentional parentage served to affect the ends of the contract into which
the parties had entered. However, protections against unfairness, normally
provided in the process ofjudicial review of a contract were absent, since the
contract itself was not examined for flaws that might have led to
invalidation. 45
The intent-approach applied in Buzzanca resembles the Kass approach
in certain regards, and the R.R. approach in other regards. Those similarities
and differences reflect, and in large part follow from, the facts of the three
cases. Thus, the cases form a harmonious set, indicating that different aspects
of reproductive technology require different legal responses.

342. Id. (emphasis omitted).
343. See id. at 293; Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783.
344. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (quoting Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal
Matrixfor New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 196 (1986)).
345. See Coleman, supra note 80, at 511 (noting inconsistency between approach based on notion
of intentional parentage and contract approach, insofar as second approach, but not first, allows "an inquiry
into gross unfairness in determining whether promises must be kept").
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Of the three cases, the facts of Kass can most easily be disentangled from
a familial perspective. Not only were the Kasses dissolving their marriage,
but Kass, unlike Buzzanca and R.R., did not involve children. Had the
embryos in Kass been categorized as "humans" or "children"--as were the
embryos in Davis by the trial court in that case-it would have been difficult,
if not impossible, on social, moral, and legal grounds, to enforce the
contractual agreements into which the Kasses had entered.346 Thus, Kass only
involved the interests of adult family members. The court of appeal's decision
followed from the law's increasing willingness to define adult family
members as autonomous individuals and, accordingly, to permit them to
negotiate the terms of their relationships, and to cement those negotiations in
legal accords.
In contrast, both Buzzanca and R.P. involved children, whose fates were
to be determined by judicial decisions regarding their potential parents' rights
and duties. Accordingly, both decisions reflect the language-if not the
ideological assumptions-of family relationships and family law. In
Buzzanca, as in RR., the court was reluctant to abandon the legal approaches
found in the market place when dealing with family matters. However, R.R.
conclusively preserves the essential approach-as well as the rhetoric and
sentiment-associated with family matters and family law. Buzzanca does
not. Buzzanca preserves only the rhetoric and, to a lesser degree, the
sentiment of family law rooted in status.
What, then, explains this difference? Both cases involved children
conceived, gestated, and born, as a consequence of surrogacy contracts. Only
R.R., however, involved a "mother" as the term was traditionally understood
before the advent of reproductive technology. According to traditional
understandings of family, Michele Hoagland, the surrogate in R.R., was
indisputably the mother. Thus, whatever the intentions of the father and his
wife, the surrogate could not be deprived of her essential maternity." 7 The
Buzzanca court expanded the implications of Johnson by extending intentional
parentage to a woman biologically unconnected to the child involved.
However, it did not deprive a "mother," in the traditional sense, of her
maternity.

346. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 at *2 (Blount County Cir. Ct.
Sept. 21, 1989) (after defining embryos as children, trial court defined its task as protecting "best interests"
of embryos).
347. In fact, the relationships among the parties in R.R. were determined before the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts heard the case. See supranotes 200-01 and accompanying text. However,
in considering the enforceability of surrogacy contracts in Massachusetts, the court determined that a
traditional surrogate-consents and intents notwithstanding-has all the rights of maternity until at least
four days after the birth of her child. See R.R., 689 N.E. 2d at 796.
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The law is most comfortable discarding, or significantly reconstructing,
traditional understandings of family in cases involving adult family members
and not children. Such re-definitions are evident in the so-called divorce
revolution, in the enforcement of cohabitation agreements and prenuptial
agreements, and in cases involving cryopreserved embryos. In cases that
involve children, the law-as reflected in both Johnson and Buzzanca-is
reluctant to abandon the rhetoric of family even when it looks to the world of
intention (and contract) to determine the parentage of actual children. In
general, some such decisions may serve the best interests of the children
involved; others may not. In either case, invoking children's interests in order
to serve the interests of various adults has long been common in family law.34
Finally, the law adheres most assiduously to traditional understandings about
family and to traditional rules that reflect those understandings in cases
involving children in relation to their biological mothers.349 In such cases,
there is least room for analyses that borrow, explicitly or implicitly, from the
metaphors of the marketplace.
In sum, in cases occasioned by reproductive technology, courts have been
more or less ready to relinquish or to reconstruct traditional assumptions about
family and parentage depending first, on the extent to which the technology
involved has challenged traditional assumptions about biological maternity,
and second on the presence or absence of actual children. Thus, in cases such
as R.R., involving a child and a surrogate defined unambiguously as that
child's biological mother, courts have widely assumed the biological mother
to be the mother ab initio. Thus, PR.differs from Buzzanca and Kass in most
clearly mirroring traditional understandings of parentage and family.
However, R.R. and Buzzanca together, differ from Kass in that Kass alone
involved no actual children. Thus, the Kass court, unlike the courts that
decided R.R. and Buzzanca, was willing to rely directly on contractual
agreements to resolve a dispute concerning reproductive technology.
CONCLUSION

In 1978, the world reacted with wonder and with fear to the birth of the
first child conceived in a culture dish.35 In the succeeding two decades, the
rapid development of reproductive technology challenged-and

348. See, Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia,Contradictionand the New Reproductive
Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 474 (1996) (noting limitations of "best interest" standard in actually
serving children's interests).
349. The term "biological mother," here, refers to a woman who gestates a baby conceived from
her ovum.
350. See, e.g., Peter Gwynne, AllAbout that Baby, NEWSWEEK,Aug. 7, 1978, at 66.
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threatened-bed-rock assumptions about the nature of human reproduction
and consequently, assumptions about the scope and character of familial
relationships. Within a very short period of time, it became possible to
separate reproduction from sexuality, to distribute the tasks of biological
maternity among several women, and to reorder the spatial and temporal
parameters of human reproduction. In addition, a large industry has developed
around human reproduction. Third parties, including doctors, lawyers,
mediators, brokers, ova and sperm donors, and gestational surrogates, have
become an essential part of human reproduction for many people. Inevitably,
disputes have developed among potential parents and others participating in
the reproductive process. Legislatures have responded slowly to the dilemmas
created by reproductive technology. As a result, the American legal response
to these dilemmas has come primarily from courts that are compelled to
respond to the claims of particular disputants.
Within a remarkably short time-at least from the perspective of cultural
history-American courts, though often hesitant and confused, have sketched
the outlines of a broad, though still evolving, response to the conundrums
presented by surrogacy and by reproductive technology. That response
reflects a culture committed to safeguarding traditional understandings of
family and, at the same time, anxious to redefine familial relationships
through the metaphors of the marketplace.
Thus, despite the persistent cry of the American judiciary for a legislative
response to the dilemmas produced by reproductive technology,35 ' society
seems increasingly well-served by decisions reached by courts that operate
with little or no legislative direction. Indeed, the contours of the judicial
response, indicated by Buzzanca, R. R., and Kass, read as a group, provide a
model around which statutes can be successfully created. At least in the main,
society is likely to be more comfortable with such statutes than with laws
promulgated by legislators, influenced by lobbyists, or overly concerned with
responses from vociferous, rather than from representative, voters.
The emerging judicial consensus is incomplete and continues to evolve.
Significant questions await responses. For instance, practical questions about
intentional parentage remain unanswered. Despite the sentimental attraction
of distinguishing intentional from contractual parentage, the result is
unsettling. If intentions are to be identified through reference to contractual
agreements, how long can society refrain from applying contract law more
directly to cases involving children and their welfare? Will the law rely on
two essential models for determining parentage-an adoption model, and a
"natural" parentage model? Or will additional models be recognized so that,

351. See supra notes 39-42.
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for instance, parentage grounded on intent or consent is categorized separately
from other sorts of parentage?
These questions notwithstanding, a framework within which American
law can respond to disputes occasioned by reproductive technology has clearly
emerged. This framework promises, at least for the moment, to satisfy the
demands of modernity and of tradition. So, although in cases involving
reproductive technology, familial relationships are no longer widely and
conclusively grounded in natural truth, a few "natural truths" survive. Thus,
for instance, courts assume the maternity of so-called "traditional" surrogates,
even as they describe intentional parents as "natural" parents in other contexts.
In consequence, choice-the correlate of modernity-is welcomed and, at the
same time, through other choices, images of enduring, affective, "traditional"
families are preserved.

